Contribution in Private Actions under the Federal Antitrust Laws by Schwartz, Stuart R. et al.
SMU Law Review
Volume 33 | Issue 3 Article 2
1979
Contribution in Private Actions under the Federal
Antitrust Laws
Stuart R. Schwartz
N. Henry Simpson III
Richard L. Arnold
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review by
an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Stuart R. Schwartz, et al., Contribution in Private Actions under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 33 Sw L.J. 779 (1979)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol33/iss3/2
CONTRIBUTION IN PRIVATE ACTIONS UNDER THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS
by
Stuart R. Schwartz, * N. Henry Simpson, JJJ, **
and Richard L. Arnold***
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. CONTRIBUTION AT COMMON LAW
A. Development of the Right to Contribution
Common Law Origins of Contribution
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act




II. CONTRIBUTION UNDER THE ANTITRUST STATUTES
A. Joint and Several Liability
B. The Right to Contribution for Intentional Torts
Contribution for Intentional Violations of Federal Securities
Laws
Contribution for Intentional Violations of Antitrust Law
C. Prognosis for Contribution in Antitrust Cases
III. APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES AND THE EFFECTS OF SETTLEMENT
A. Division of Liability
Apportionment at Common Law
Pro Rata Apportionment
Comparative Fault Apportionment
B. The Effects of Settlement on Damage Apportionment
Settlement in Securities and Admiralty Cases
Effects of Settlement in Antitrust Cases
C. Insolvent or Absent Defendants
IV. PROCEDURAL DEVICES FOR ASSERTING THE CONTRIBUTION CLAIM
V. CONCLUSION
The Eighth Circuit's recent decision of Professional Beauty Supply, Inc.
v. National Beauty Supply, Inc.' announced for the first time at the federal
• B.A., Northwestern University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at
Law, El Paso, Texas.
** B.A., Southern Methodist University; M.A., University of Chicago; J.D., Southern
Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
•** B.A., J.D., Southern Methodist University. Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas.
1. 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979). As this Article went to press, the Fifth Circuit an-
nounced its decision in Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., ANTITRUST
& TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 936, at F-I (5th Cir. Oct. 16, 1979), holding that no right of
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
appellate level that contribution is available between antitrust defendants
in private damages actions. Because this decision is a dramatic break with
traditional authorities, a conflict among the circuits may be expected to
develop on this issue. The decision also raises other unsettled issues, such
as the proper method of apportionment of damages and the effects of set-
tlement on damage apportionment. This Article reviews the developments
leading to Professional Beauty Supply and explores possible treatments of a
new rule allowing contribution to antitrust defendants, including methods
of apportioning damages, the proper treatment of settlements, the effect of
insolvent or absent defendants, and available procedural devices for as-
serting a contribution claim.
I. CONTRIBUTION AT COMMON LAW
A. Development of the Right to Contribution
The doctrine of contribution gives the right to one who has discharged a
common liability to recover from others who are jointly liable their respec-
tive shares of that common obligation.2 Historically, once a person has
been compelled by a legal duty to pay or satisfy more than his fair share of
a common burden or obligation, he is entitled to contribution from others
jointly liable as long as his liability is not founded upon a malicious or
intentional act.3 Because contribution traces its origin to equity, rather
than contract, it serves as a means of assisting in the fair division of loss,
thereby preventing injustice.4 As a consequence, the measure of recovery
contribution is available to an antitrust defendant under the federal antitrust laws. The
court based its decision in lar.e part on the "prevailing economic theory" that the "possibil-
ity of imposition of sole liability has an enhanced deterrent effect" on would-be defendants.
Id. at F-2. The court also rejected arguments that (1) a rule prohibiting contribution would
encourage collusion between the plaintiff and one or more potential defendants so as to
exclude those defendants from the litigation; (2) denying contribution is inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's rejection of in pari deicto as a defense to an antitrust action; (3) denial
of contribution in an antitrust context is inconsistent with the allowance of contribution
under other federal statutes; and (4) denying contribution amounts to a taking of property
without fifth amendment due process and equal protection of the laws. Id. at F-3. In a
partially dissenting opinion, Judge Morgan suggested that contribution be awarded the de-
fendant whose liability is based solely on an unintentional violation of the antitrust laws.
Id. at F-5.
The decision in Abraham Construction appears to be in direct conflict with Professional
Beauty Supply, thereby ripening for determination by the Supreme Court the issue of
whether the right itself is available to antitrust defendants.
2. Gregory, Contribution Among Tortfeasors." A Uniform Practice, 13 Wis. L. REV. 365
(1938); Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 184 (1973). Contribution has also been defined as a payment
made by each person having a common interest or liability of his share in the loss suffered or
monies paid by one of the parties on behalf of the others in satisfaction of their common
obligation. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 124 Conn. 227, 199 A. 93
(1938).
3. A person who has discharged more than his proportionate share of a joint duty is
entitled to contribution from the other or others except where the payor is barred by the
wrongful nature of his conduct. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 81 (1937).
4. Vickers Petroleum Co. v. Biffle, 239 F.2d 602, 606 (10th Cir. 1956). One court went
so far as to base contribution on the principle of morality. Lovrien v. Fitzgerald, 245 Iowa
1325, 66 N.W.2d 458 (1954). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A, Com-
ment c (1965).
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is limited to the amount one obligor has paid in excess of his share, a
ratable sum of the loss actually sustained,' and no more.6
The right to contribution arises long before the right to recover for con-
tribution. While the former is said to arise upon entering into a joint obli-
gation with others that results in liability, the latter is an inchoate right
until it arises after the liability has been discharged by one who has paid a
greater amount than his pro rata share of the liability.7 Furthermore, it is
not sufficient that the obligor discharge the joint liability of his own free
will; there must be a legal duty imposed, either through reasonable settle-
ment and nonsuit or through a judgment, before the discharging obligor
can assert his right to contribution.8
Common Law Origins of Contribution. At common law this general rule of
contribution was not followed when the common burden was incurred by
joint tortfeasors9 or wrongdoers, even if the discharging tortfeasor was
compelled to discharge more than his share of the liability.'° The histori-
cal precedent responsible for the denial of contribution in tort cases was
Merryweather v. Nixan, " in which the plaintiff, after satisfying a judgment
for injuries to a reversionary interest in a mill jointly caused by himself
and his codefendant,' 2 brought an action for contribution against his co-
5. Glasscock v. Hamilton, 62 Tex. 143 (1884); 18 AM. JUR. 2d Contribution § 15 (1965).
6. Contribution differs from indemnity. Unlike contribution, the right of indemnity
grants one who has been compelled to pay for damages primarily caused by another the
right to recover from the other the entire sum paid. The theory underlying indemnity is that
the primary obligation is on the person against whom indemnity is sought. Leflar, Contribu-
tion and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 130, 131 (1932); Annot., 53
A.L.R.3d 184 (1973). Indemnity is most appropriate where there is a preexisting relation-
ship or a primary right between the principal obligor and the person who has previously
discharged the obligation. Leflar, supra, at 131; Comment, Contribution Among Joint
Tortfeasors, 44 TEXAS L. REV. 326 (1965). While both contribution and indemnity are suits
for reimbursement, indemnity is based primarily upon contract; unless there is an express or
implied agreement to impute damages to another, no right to indemnity can exist. It may
still be possible, however, to seek contribution from joint obligors without contractual rela-
tionships. Kessel v. Murray, 197 Iowa 17, 196 N.W. 591 (1924). See also RESTATEMENT OF
RESTITUTION § 77 (1937) (a person who has discharged a duty that is owed by him but
which, as between himself and another, should have been discharged by the other is entitled
to indemnification); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B (1965).
7. Allbright Bros., Contractors, Inc. v. Hull-Dobbs Co., 209 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1953)
(Tenn. law). Throughout this Article, pro rata shall refer to the equal division of liability
among jointly liable wrongdoers. For example, if there are four joint wrongdoers, each
wouldbe liable for one-fourth of the total amount of liability. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 866A(h) (1965).
8. See Brown & Root, Inc. v. United States, 198 F.2d 138, 142 (5th Cir. 1952).
9. "Joint tortfeasor" has been defined as two or more persons jointly or severally liable
in tort for the same injury to persons or property, whether or not a judgment has been
recovered against them. Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 184 (1973).
10. See, e.g., Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282
(1952).
11. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
12. Prosser surmises from the "very meagre report of the case" that the judgment wasjoint and that they had acted in concert since they were joined at a period in history when
English courts did not permit joinder on any other basis. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE
LAW OF TORTS § 50 (4th ed. 1971).
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wrongdoer. Chief Justice Kenyon affirmed the trial court's nonsuit, stating
that "he had never before heard of such an action having been brought,
where the former recovery was for a tort."' 3
Although the report of the case is sparse, it is believed that the injuries to
the mill were intentionally inflicted.' 4 That being true, the case does not,
in actuality, state the "general rule" for which is it noted, but rather the
exception, which has always been true, that there is no right to contribu-
tion where the wrong done was intentional.' 5 Later English cases recog-
nized this distinction and permitted contribution among joint tortfeasors as
long as the act was unintentional and not malicious.' 6 In 1935, the right to
contribution in negligent tort actions was finally recognized by statute in
England. '7 The earlier American cases also seemed to draw the distinction
between intentional and negligent torts, allowing contribution in negli-
gence actions only.' 8 This distinction faded, however, and near unanimity
was reached quickly among the jurisdictions, denying contribution
whether the wrong complained of was intentional or negligent."' In fact,
the rule of no contribution became so pervasive that for over a century
only nine jurisdictions permitted contribution.2"
13. 101 Eng. Rep. at 1337.
14. Leflar, supra note 6, at 130; RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION, Introductory Note to
Title C, Indemnity and Contribution Between Tortfeasors 385-89 (1937); W. PROSSER, supra
note 12, § 50. As additional support for the argument that the decision involved an inten-
tional tort, the word "tort" at the time of the decision was used to refer only to intentional
actions such as battery and slander. Reath, Contribution Between Persons Jointly Chargedfor
Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARV. L. REV. 176, 178 (1898). Since the word
"tort" stands as the basis of the decision, it seems clear that Lord Kenyon based his holding
on the fact that the act was intentional.
15. It is singularly unfortunate, and has led to misunderstanding, that Mer-
ryweather v. Nixan should have been continually treated as stating the "gen-
eral rule." As a matter of fact that case states not the rule, but the exception.
The general rule is that among persons jointly liable the law applies an as-
sumpsit either for indemnity or contribution, and the exception is that no as-
sumpsit, either express or implied, will be enforced among wilful tortfeasors or
wrongdoers.
Reath, supra note 14, at 177. See also Leflar, supra note 6, at 130.
16. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 50, at 306 & nn.41 & 42.
17. Law Reform (Married Women and Tortfeasors) Act, 1935, 25 & 26 Geo. 5, c. 30,
§ 6(l)(c). The Act provides that a tortfeasor can recover contribution from a joint tortfeasor
as long as the joint actions are not wanton.
18. See W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 50, at 306 & nn.45 & 46; Reath, supra note 14, at
176.
19. Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago B. & Q.R.R., 196 U.S. 217 (1905); see W. PROS-
SER, supra note 12, § 50, at 306 & n.47; Comment, supra note 6, at 326; text accompanying
notes 55-58 infra. An underlying reason for this view may have been the notion in equity
courts that one seeking relief must come into court with clean hands. Leflar, supra note 6, at
130, citing I POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 737 (4th ed. 1918).
20. Knell v. Feltman, 174 F.2d 662 (D.C. Cir. 1949); George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital
Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942); Wiener v. United Air Lines, 216 F. Supp. 701
(S.D. Cal. 1962) (Nev. law); Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956); Quatray v.
Wicker, 178 La. 289, 151 So. 208 (1933); Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963);
Grothe v. Shaffer, 305 Minn. 17, 232 N.W.2d 227 (1975); Ankeny v. Moffett, 37 Minn. 109,
33 N.W. 320 (1887); Goldman v. Mitchell-Fletcher Co., 292 Pa. 354, 141 A. 231 (1928);
Davis v. Broad St. Garage, 191 Tenn. 320, 232 S.W.2d 355 (1950); Ellis v. Chicago & N.W.
R., 167 Wis. 392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918). Louisiana, Nevada, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and
Wisconsin have since codified these judicial decisions. See notes 49 & 50 infra.
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Although Lord Kenyon may have based his decision in Merryweather v.
Nixan2 on the lack of precedents in the area of contribution,22 certain
public policy reasons argue for the no-contribution rule. As Leflar23 saw
it, denying a tortfeasor access to the courts operated to punish him for his
misconduct and discouraged similar activities.24 Furthermore, Leflar be-
lieved that the rule denying contribution served as a deterrent by instilling
a fear of being held accountable for the entire liability, not only his but his
cotortfeasors' as well.25 A third policy ground is that the plaintiff should
have the choice of whom to sue; to deny that right would be to eliminate
one of the major advantages the plaintiff has.26
However slowly, dissatisfaction with the rule denying contribution in-
creased.27 Scholars debated the advantages and disadvantages of contri-
bution in negligence causes of action.2" While all agreed that the no-
21. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
22. See text accompanying note 13 supra.
23. Leflar, supra note 6.
24. Id. at 133. See also Bohlen, Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 21
CORNELL L.Q. 552, 557 (1936).
25. Leflar, supra note 6, at 134. Leflar was also concerned that the courts did not have
sufficient time to adjudicate disputes concerning transactions that "flout the very law which
the courts are asked to administer." Id.
26. See, e.g., James, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors: .4 Pragmatic Criticism, 54
HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1161 (1941) ("[Allowing contribution] puts the plaintiff at a disadvan-
tage in pre-trial bargaining, where he can no longer play one defendant off against the other,
with the fear of each that unless he settles he may have to bear alone the full weight of the
verdict."). See also Comment, supra note 6, at 326. Leflar has also stated that to deny the
plaintiff the right to sue whom he or she chooses might cause some of the joint tortfeasors to
collusively influence plaintiffs selection of the unfortunate defendants. Leflar, supra note 6,
at 137.
27. As Prosser put it:
There is obvious lack of sense and justice in a rule which permits the entire
burden of a loss, for which two defendants were equally, unintentionally re-
sponsible, to be shouldered onto one alone, according to . . . the plaintiffs
whim or spite, or his collusion with the other wrongdoer, while the latter goes
scot free.
W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 50 at 307 (footnotes omitted).
28. See, e.g., James, supra note 26; Gregory, Contribution Among Joint Tort/easors." A
Defense, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1170 (1941); James, Replication, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1178 (1941);
Gregory, Rejoinder, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1184 (1941). Professor Fleming James, writing in
favor of the "general rule" against contribution, was concerned that granting such a right
would make an individual tortfeasor reluctant to settle a claim, knowing he could be forced
to return to the action on a claim for contribution if a judgment is subsequently rendered
against his cotortfeasor in his absence. As he put it, "a claimant cannot by covenant protect
one wrongdoer against contribution claims which might accrue to other wrongdoers."
James, supra note 26, at 1160. James believed that contribution tended to favor the more
affluent defendant at the expense of the poor and weak since, from his study of the cases, it
was apparent that an insured individual would always bring an action for contribution in
those states that allowed it, although the reverse was not true, for uninsured defendants did
not seek contribution as often. Id. at 1165-67. It was not only the tortfeasors that concerned
James, however. He was also interested in serving the interests of the plaintiff whom he felt
would be disadvantaged by being unable to settle unless he or she could reach a settlement
with all tortfeasors. Id. at 1161. Furthermore, there were numerous tactical advantages why
the plaintiff might wish to sue one defendant and not another. To allow the defendant to
abrogate that decision would destroy those advantages. James listed popularity of the de-
fendant, confusion of the issues to the jury, and the possibility that the third party defendant
19791
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contribution rule should apply when intentional tortfeasors are involved,29
the minority view granting a right to contribution among joint tortfeasors
in unintentional torts gained increasing support, 30 and Merryweather be-
gan losing its appeal. In certain states, the rule was abrogated by judicial
decision; 31 in others, it was changed by statute.32 Eventually, the trend to
allow contribution became so pervasive that Merryweather was no longer
the general rule. This trend, however, did not change the rule that always
existed that contribution could not be enforced between willful or inten-
tional joint tortfeasors.33
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act. To create uniformity
among the various state approaches to contribution, the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws drafted the first Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act in 1939.34 It adopted a uniform ap-
proach to the modern trend of permitting contribution among joint
tortfeasors. 35 Section 1 of the Uniform Act grants a right to contribution
when two or more persons are jointly and severally liable in tort for the
same injury to person or damage to property.36 The right to contribution
exists regardless of whether a judgment has been recovered against any or
could defeat the liability the plaintiff could have otherwise had against the named defend-
ants as three such advantages. Id. at 1164-65.
Professor Charles Gregory, who viewed contribution as a "sense of community justice or
fairness" countered James's concerns about settlement as justification for endorsing the rule
of no contribution by pointing to the recently drafted Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act (1939 version) as one means of disposing of that problem. The Act provides
that settlement discharges the settling tortfeasor from subsequent claims for contribution as
long as the remaining liability is reduced by the amount of the settling tortfeasor's propor-
tionate share of the total liability in contribution proceedings. Gregory, Contribution Among
Joint Tortfeasors: 4 Defense, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1170, 1172-73 (1941) (citing UNIFORM CON-
TRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT §§ 4 & 5 (1939 version)).
29. "[T]he common law is settled, and there seems to be no demand for a change-there
can be no non-contractual contribution between tortfeasors who knew and intended the tor-
tious consequences of their misconduct." Leflar, supra note 6, at 139 (citing Merryweather
v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799)). See also UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG
TORTFEASORS ACT § 1(c).
30. Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 1366 (1958).
31. See, e.g., Farwell v. Becker, 129 Ill. 261, 21 N.E. 792 (1889).
32. See, e.g., N.Y. CIVIL PRACTICE ACT § 21 1-a, quoted in Hadcock v. Wiggins, 147
Misc. 252, 263 N.Y.S. 583, 584 (Sup. Ct. Cayuga County 1933); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 2212 (Vernon 1925), as citedin Oats v. Dublin Nat'l Bank, 127 Tex. 2, 10, 90 S.W.2d
824, 829 (1936).
33. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A(3), & Comment j (1965).
34. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT (1939 version). One of the
early reformers in the field of negligence cases, Profesor Gregory served as Reporter for the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws during the period within
which the Uniform Act was drafted. See note 28 supra.
35. The commissioners explained this approach by noting that "[a]ll tortfeasors are not
rascals," and articulating a goal of proportionate distribution of the common burden among
those tortfeasors upon whom it rests. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT,
Commissioners' Prefatory Note (1939 version). In 1955, the draft was revised after the Con-
ference of Commissioners recognized that several states had enacted statutes differing from
the language suggested by the 1939 Act. The new Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act retained the same general purpose, however. Id. Commissioners' Prefatory
Note.
36. Id. § l(a).
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all of the joint tortfeasors, thus allowing for contribution to recover por-
tions of out-of-court settlements.37 A precondition to recovery, however,
requires that the tortfeasor pay more than his pro rata share of the com-
mon liability.38 Moreover, his total contribution recovery is limited to the
amount paid by him in excess of his pro rata share.
39
A difficult question arises, however, when one tortfeasor settles his own
liability and receives, in exchange, a release40 or covenant not to sue4 '
from the injured party. First, does the release by the injured party of one
tortfeasor bar pursuit of his claim against another tortfeasor? Secondly,
does the settlement and release bar the cotortfeasor's right to contribution
against the settling tortfeasor, assuming both tortfeasors are found liable?42
In jurisdictions that barred contribution these questions never arose; the
fact that the injured person settled with one of several tortfeasors was im-
material. Once the states began to allow contribution, finding solutions to
these problems became imperative.
In answer to the first question, the Uniform Act permits the plaintiff to
pursue his action against the nonsettling tortfeasor, notwithstanding the
release, unless the release provides otherwise,43 but the plaintiffs claim
against the others is reduced by the greater of the amount stipulated in the
release or the covenant or in the amount of consideration paid for it.' As
to the second question, the release discharges the settling tortfeasor from
all liability for contribution to any other tortfeasor.45
Aside from these questions, the Uniform Act continues to require that
the tortfeasor's satisfaction of the common liability must be the result of a
legal duty before it entitles him to contribution from his cotortfeasors.4 6
Furthermore, it is not sufficient that the tortfeasor merely settle with the
claimant. In order to entitle the settling tortfeasor to contribution, the set-
tlement must extinguish the liability of the other cotortfeasors as well.4 7
Moreover, in an attempt to prevent collusion between the settling
tortfeasor and the claimant, the Uniform Act requires that the settlement
37. Id.
38. Id. § l(b).
39. Id. This section goes on to state that "[N]o tortfeasor is compelled to make contri-
bution beyond his own pro rata share of the entire liability." These rules comport with
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1965), discussed in note 53 bnfra.
40. A release is a written contract or agreement by which a disputed claim or right is
given up or abandoned to the person against whom the claim exists. Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d
1374 (1970).
41. A covenant not to sue provides that, for consideration, the injured party will not
bring suit against settling tortfeasors. Unless otherwise provided, the covenant reserves a
cause of action against the nonsettling tortfeasor. See Comment, supra note 6, at 335-40.
42. The difficulty inherent in these problems can best be exemplified by noting that the
American Law Institute took no position on the subject in its RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 886A (1965).
43. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4(a). Contra, Annot., 104
A.L.R. 846 (1936); Annot., 50 A.L.R. 1057 (1927). See also Comment, supra note 6, at 334.
44. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4(a).
45. Id. § 4(b).
46. Id. § 1(a).
47. Id. § l(d).
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be reasonable.4 8
Currently, fifteen jurisdictions have enacted the Uniform Act or some
variation of it.49 Other jurisdictions that recognize a right to contribution
have chosen not to adopt the Uniform Act, however. Some provide for
similar relief through their own legislative enactments,5" while others have
been content to permit the courts to grant the right themselves through
changes in the common law I.5  In general, these judicial and statutory
rules are similar in that they all provide for contribution if three elements
are present: (1) a common liability on the part of the negligent tortfeasors,
(2) a compulsory (legal) discharge of this common liability, either by way
of judgment or settlement, and (3) the placement of an unequal portion of
that common burden upon the party seeking contribution2 Once these
three elements exist, the right to contribution ripens from an inchoate right
to a judicial right.5 3
B. The Right to Contribution in Federal Common Law
While the principle of Merryweather v. Nixan54 may have been abro-
gated in some state jurisdictions by legislative enactment or judicial
48. Id.
49. ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.16.010-.060 (1973); ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1001 to -1009
(1962); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 13-50.5-101 to -106 (Cum. Supp. 1978); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
10, §§ 6301-6308 (1975); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.31 (West Supp. 1979); HAWAII REV. STAT.
§§ 663-11 to -17 (1976); MD. ANN. CODE art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1972); MASS. ANN. LAWS. ch.
231B, §§ 1-4 (Michie/Law. Co-op 1974); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 17.215-.325 (1973 & Supp.
1975); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-1-11 to -18 (1953); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ IB-I to -6 (1969 &
Supp. 1977); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(b) (Purdon 1979); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 10-6-1
to -11 (1970 & Cum. Supp. 1978); S.D. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 15-8-11 to -22 (1967); TENN.
CODE. ANN. §§ 23-3101 to -3106 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
50. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 875-880 (West Supp. 1979); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 105-2012 (Cum. Supp. 1979); IDAHO CODE §§ 6-803 to -806 (1979); Ky. REV. STAT.
§ 412.030 (1972); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2203 (West 1952); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 600.2925a-d (Cum. Supp. 1979-1980); MISs. CODE ANN. § 85-5-5 (1972); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 537.060 (Vernon 1953); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:53A-1 to -5 (West 1952); NEW YORK CIV.
PRAC. LAW § 1401-04 (McKinney 1976); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 32-38-01 to -04 (1976); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.31-.32 (Page Supp. 1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 832 (West
Cum. Supp. 1978-1979); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 18.440-.460 (1977); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN.
arts. 2212, 2212a (Vernon 1971 & Supp. 1978-1979); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-27-39 to -43
(1977); VA. CODE § 8.01-34 (1977); W. VA. CODE § 55-7-13 (1966); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 113.01-.I1 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1979-1980); Wvo. STAT. §§ 1-1-110 to -113 (1977).
51. See, e.g., George's Radio, Inc. v. Capital Transit Co., 126 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1942);
Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977); Na-
tional Farmers Union Property & Cas. Co. v. Nelson, 260 Iowa 163, 147 N.W.2d 839 (1967);
Best v. Yerkes, 247 Iowa 800, 77 N.W.2d 23 (1956); Bedell v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d
24 (1963); Grothe v. Shaffer, 305 Minn. 17, 232 N.W.2d 227 (1975); Ankeny v. Moffett, 37
Minn. 109, 33 N.W. 320 (1887); Royal Indem. Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 193 Neb. 752,
229 N.W.2d 183 (1975).
52. See Comment, supra note 6, at 329-33.
53. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1965), which grants a right to
contribution between unintentional joint tortfeasors regardless of whether a judgment
against any of them has been entered. The right arises when one tortfeasor discharges the
entire claim for the harm by paying more than his pro rata share of the common liability.
There is no right to contribution in favor of one who has made a partial payment of that
liability. Id. § 886A, Comment f.
54. 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799); see notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 33
CONTRIBUTION IN PRI VA TEA CTIONS
changes, the traditional principle denying contribution in tort cases has
long been embedded in the federal common law, absent statutory preemp-
tion." The Supreme Court first articulated its own no-contribution rule in
Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad,56 in
which an injured employee sued a stock yard company after a faulty brake
on a railroad car injured him. The plaintiff recovered on the ground that
the injuries were caused by the company's negligence in failing to inspect
cars within its yard. 7 Following payment of the judgment, the company
brought an action seeking contribution from the railroad that owned the
faulty car. The Court refused to allow contribution, stating that "the gen-
eral principle of law is well settled that one of several wrongdoers cannot
recover against another wrongdoer, although he may have been compelled
to pay all the damages for the wrong done."5 8
Admiralty Law. Almost fifty years later, the Court made it clear that it
still had no desire to depart from the common law rule against contribu-
tion. In Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Rflting Corp. 59 the plain-
tiff brought an action to assert contribution in a noncollision admiralty
case.6" The Court refused to fashion such a rule in the absence of congres-
sional action. While the Court recognized that some dissatisfaction existed
with a rule that compelled one tortfeasor to bear the entire burden of a loss
not entirely caused by his negligence, 6' it was convinced that "legislative
consideration and action can best bring about a fair accommodation of the
diverse but related interests of these groups."" As Congress had stopped
short of creating a right to contribution when it enacted the Longshore-
men's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act,6 3 the Court believed that
it was inappropriate for it to do so.'
The Court retreated somewhat from its position in Halcyon when it later
permitted contribution in another noncollision admiralty case. In Cooper
Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc. 65 the Court distinguished Halcyon and
Atlantic Coast Line Railroad v. Erie Lackawanna Railroad66 by noting that
the joint tortfeasor against whom contribution was sought in those cases
55. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 11(f), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1976); Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, §§ 9(e), 18(b), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e), 78r(b) (1976).
56. 196 U.S. 217 (1905).
57. Id. at 219.
58. Id. at 224.
59. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
60. As to admiralty actions that involved collision due to the fault of both tortfeasors,
admiralty law recognized the doctrine that each is to share equally the damages sustained by
each, as well as the damage inflicted upon an innocent third person. See, e.g., The "North
Star," 106 U.S. 17 (1882).
61. 342 U.S. at 285.
62. Id. at 286. The Court concluded that "it would be unwise to attempt to fashion new
judicial rules of contribution" in the absence of congressional action. Id. at 285.
63. 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1976 & Supp. 1970-1977).
64. 342 U.S. at 287; accord, Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 406
U.S. 340 (1972).
65. 417 U.S. 106 (1974).
66. 406 U.S. 340 (1972).
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was immune from tort liability under the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act.67 Such was not the case in Cooper Stevedor-
ing. There, the injured longshoreman brought an action against owners of
a vessel for injuries sustained when he fell into a gap in a pile of crates
loaded by Cooper. The owners filed a third-party complaint against
Cooper for contribution. Since the Act's limitation-of-liability provision
was inapplicable to the facts, the Court followed the previous trend of the
Court by liberalizing the application of division of damages in situations in
which it was deemed to be "just and proper."68 It is important to note,
however, that the Court has restricted contribution to negligence causes of
actions, 69 thus preserving the rule against contribution between intentional
wrongdoers.7 ° If a deliberate and intentional tort committed by two admi-
ralty tortfeasors caused injury to another, it is doubtful that the Supreme
Court would allow contribution.
Federal Aviation Law. Admiralty law is not, however, the only area of
federal common law that has seen a trend toward contribution. In Kohr v.
Allegheny Airlines, Inc.71 the Seventh Circuit permitted contribution in a
federal aviation case. Allegheny Airlines and the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration (FAA), as cotortfeasors, had agreed on a pro rata formula to
be employed in disposing of claims brought on behalf of passengers killed
in a midair collision. Three other defendants were not parties to the agree-
ment. After satisfying the first group of passenger claims, both the FAA
and Allegheny asserted claims for contribution against the other defend-
ants. The trial court dismissed these third-party complaints.72 On appeal,
the Seventh Circuit permitted Allegheny Airlines and the FAA to assert a
right of contribution. Finding federal law applicable,73 the court deter-
67. 417 U.S. at 109; see 33 U.S.C. § 905 (Supp. 1970-1977). The Act grants immunity to
the employer when an employee is injured.
68. 417 U.S. at 110. Professor Lefiar notes that admiralty has always been different,
fashioning a rule whereby the injured party and the tortfeasor, both negligent, are required
to divide the total loss between them equally. He concluded that such a position avoids both
the common law rule of no contribution as well as the newer doctrine of contributory negli-
gence. Leflar, supra note 6, at 138-39. See generally Staring, Contribution and Division of
Damages in Admiralty and Maritime Cases, 45 CALIF. L. REV. 304 (1957).
69. See, e.g., Avondale Shipyards, Inc. v. Vessel Thomas E. Cuffe, 434 F. Supp. 920,
931 (E.D. La. 1977) (citing Cooper, 417 U.S. at 115), in which the court held that contribu-
tion under Cooper rests upon a finding of concurrent fault.
70. "Under the statutes or apart from them, the tendency has been to continue the origi-
nal rule that there is no contribution in favor of those who commit intentional torts ...."
W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 50, at 308. The same principle was incorporated into the
UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § I(C). See notes 34-53 supra and
accompanying text. One major exception to this general principle has developed under the
Securities Acts. See notes 83, 121-26 infra and accompanying text.
71. 504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
72. Id. at 402.
73. 504 F.2d at 403. Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's statement in Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins that "[t]here is no federal general common law," 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), the fed-
eral common law still lives in a number of areas. In Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States,
318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943), the Supreme Court stated that in the absence of a federal statute,
"it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule according to their own standards."
In Kohr the Seventh Circuit applied a federal common law right of contribution to an area
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mined that a federal rule of contribution and indemnity among joint
tortfeasors should control in aviation collision suits and rejected as being
"outmoded and entirely unsatisfactory" the argument that favored the old
common law rule of no contribution. 4
Federal Securities Laws. Without express statutory authority, courts have
similarly fashioned a right to contribution under section 10(b) of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 7 and rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder. 6
In deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co." the United States District Court for
Colorado noted the express provision for contribution in sections 9(e)78
and 18(b)7 9 of the 1934 Act and concluded that contribution should also be
implied when liability is alleged under section 10(b).80 The position taken
in de Haas has received support from numerous courts confronted with the
same question.8' These courts have permitted contribution primarily be-
cause of their dissatisfaction with the alternative of allowing defendants to
escape liability simply because the plaintiff has sued one of the other joint
perceived to be "the predominant, indeed almost exclusive, interest of the federal govern-
ment in regulating the affairs of the nation's airways." 504 F.2d at 403. It also found that
such a position avoids the application of differing state laws concerning contribution and
indemnity and thus eliminates inconsistency of result in similar collision occurrences. Id.
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied upon both Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Minne-
sota, 322 U.S. 292 (1944), and § 1108 of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C.
§ 1508(a) (1976).
It appears undecided whether a right to contribution exists under title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976). The courts have permitted cer-
tain defendants to counterclaim for contribution against unions that may be partially re-
sponsible for alleged sex discrimination. See, e.g., International Union of Elec. Workers v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 73 F.R.D. 57 (W.D.N.Y. 1976) (contribution, rather than align-
ment, is the appropriate procedural device for raising claim to counterclaim); Grogg v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 72 F.R.D. 523 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (counterclaim against union for
contribution appropriate). But see Younger v. Glamorgan Pipe & Foundry Co., 418 F.
Supp. 743, 797 (W.D. Va. 1976), vacated on other grounds, 561 F.2d 563 (4th Cir. 1977) (no
federal common law right to contribution under title VII).
74. 504 F.2d at 405 (citing W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 50). The court went a step
further by advocating a system of comparative negligence whereby the trier of fact is asked
to determine on a percentage basis the degree of negligence of each tortfeasor. 1d.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976).
76. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
77. 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), modfied on other grounds, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th
Cir. 1970).
78. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976).
79. Id. § 78r(b).
80. 286 F. Supp. at 815-16 (citing 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1739-40 n.178
(1961)).
81. McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Del. 1978), rev'don other grounds, 599
F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979); Rice v. McDonnell & Co., 442 F. Supp. 952, 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1977);
Wassel v. Eglowsky, 399 F. Supp. 1330 (D. Md. 1975), a'don opinion below, 542 F.2d 1235
(4th Cir. 1976); Odette v. Shearson, Hammil & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
Muth v. Dechert, Price & Rhoads, 391 F. Supp. 935, 939 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Gould v. Ameri-
can-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 169 (D. Del. 1974); Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v.
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Liggett & Myers, Inc. v.
Bloomfield, 380 F. Supp. 1044, 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv.,
Inc. (Globus II), 318 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), a f'dper curiam on opinion below,




tortfeasors who has subsequently satisfied all of their common liability. 2
The District Court for the Southern District of New York has even held
that intentional tortfeasors may obtain contribution from one another for
section 10(b) violations.83
Only recently have courts considered whether in federal treble damage
antitrust actions the old common law rule disallowing contribution should
be abandoned in favor of the modern trend in state and other federal
cases. Currently, only the Eighth Circuit84 and the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas 5 have allowed contribution in
antitrust cases. Two other circuits are considering the question.86 Both of
those cases were appealed from decisions that refused to recognize the de-
fendants' right to contribution.87 Because of the potential conflict develop-
ing among the circuits, it is useful to consider the grounds upon which
courts have permitted or denied contribution in the antitrust context.
II. CONTRIBUTION UNDER THE ANTITRUST STATUTES
Violations of the federal antitrust statutes almost inherently involve con-
certed activity. Accordingly, the resulting principles of joint and several
liability have been carefully developed by federal courts, both with respect
to the effects of settlement and the calculation of treble damages. Contri-
bution under an antitrust cause of action traditionally has been denied be-
cause of the intentional nature of the offense and the absence of statutory
authority. Recent developments under the federal securities laws allowing
contribution for intentional violations, coupled with the basic purposes of
the antitrust statutes, now argue for a new rule permitting contribution.
A. Joint and Several Liability
It has long been recognized that an action based upon sections 188 and
82. Fischer, Contribution in lOb-SActions, 33 Bus. LAW. 1821, 1826-27 (1978).
83. Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).
84. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179
(8th Cir. 1979).
85. Little Rock School Dist. v. Borden, Inc., [1980-1] Trade Cas. 63,059 (E.D. Ark.
1979).
86. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Spencer Foods, Inc., Nos. 3-77-0780, 3-77-0990 & 3-
77-1080 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-3346 (5th Cir. Oct. 26, 1978);
Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., No. 75-2820 (E.D. La. Oct. 5, 1977),
appealdocketed, No. 78-1788 (5th Cir. Apr. 14, 1978); Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores,
Inc., [1977-2] Trade Cas. 61,698 (D. Utah), appeal docketed, No. 77-2068 (10th Cir. Dec.
20, 1977).
87. The District Court for the Southern District of Texas recently followed the trend
among the lower courts to deny the right to contribution. In In re Corrugated Container
Antitrust Litigation, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 919, at E-1 (S.D. Tex.
May 30, 1978), the court denied motions by four corrugated container manufacturers for
leave to amend their answers to assert cross-claims for contribution against settling defend-
ants. For a discussion of the case, see note 163 infra.
88. "Every contract, combination ... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 15 U.S.C. § I
(1976).
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289 of the Sherman Act and section 4 of the Clayton Act9" is founded upon
a tort theory of liability.9 ' Accordingly, each joint antitrust tortfeasor is
jointly and severally liable for antitrust law violations.92 The plaintiff thus
has the privilege of suing only those defendants it wishes while still hold-
ing all violators accountable for the entire sum of damages caused by the
conspiracy.93 In City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works 94
the plaintiff sued two pipe manufacturers to recover for overcharges on
sales made by a third member of the conspiracy. In permitting the case
against the two manufacturers to proceed without the third coconspirator,
the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated that it was of "no vital
significance" 95 that the third corporation was not sued. The court as-
sumed, therefore, that the only limitation the plaintiff faced concerned the
amount of damages he could collect from any or all defendant coconspira-
tors. Which defendant the plaintiff recovered from was irrelevant, but he
was entitled to only one recovery.96 If an antitrust plaintiff recovers an
item of damages from one coconspirator through a release, he may not
recover that same item later from another coconspirator, although each
coconspirator remains severally responsible for the unsatisfied amount of
89. "Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce
among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be guilty of a felony . I..." Id. § 2.
90. Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of any-
thing forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of
the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or
has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a rea-
sonable attorney's fee.
Id. § 15.
91. Solomon v. Houston Corrugated Box Co., 526 F.2d 389, 392 n.4 (5th Cir. 1976);
Northwestern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967, 970 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
321 U.S. 792 (1943); Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 11-12 (N.D. Ga. 1973);
Fagan v. Sunbeam Lighting Co., Inc., Eastern, 303 F. Supp. 356, 358 (S.D. Ill. 1969).
92. City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works, 127 F. 23 (6th Cir. 1903),
afd, 203 U.S. 390 (1906); see C. HILLS, ANTITRUST ADVISOR 831 (2d ed. 1978); Develop-
ments in the Law-Competitive Torts, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888, 925-32 (1964). Contra, Com-
ment, Contribution in Private Antitrust Suits, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 682, 692 (1978). See also
Solomon v. Houston Corrugated Box Co., 526 F.2d 389, 392 n.4 (5th Cir. 1976); Northwest-
ern Oil Co. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 138 F.2d 967, 970 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321
U.S. 792 (1944); Sidney Morris & Co. v. National Ass'n of Stationers, Office Outfitters &
Mfrs., 40 F.2d 620, 624 (1930); Tondas v. Amateur Hockey Ass'n of the United States, 438 F.
Supp. 310 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists,
396F. Supp. 565, 571 (N.D. 11. 1975); Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 11 (N.D.
Ga. 1973); Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Cal. 1968);
Ayers v. Pastime Amusement Co., 259 F. Supp. 358, 359 (D.S.C. 1966); Rector v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc., 102 F. Supp. 263, 264 (S.D. Cal. 1952); Farmers Co-Operative Oil Co. v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 43 F. Supp. 735, 738 (N.D. Iowa 1942).
93. Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 8 (9th Cir. 1963);
Washington v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 280 F. Supp. 802 (S.D. Cal. 1968); see note 28
supra, in which James discusses the advantages given a plaintiff in situations where contri-
bution is not allowed.
94. 127 F. 23 (6th Cir. 1903), a'd, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
95. Id. at 25.
96. Wainwright v. Kraftco Corp., 58 F.R.D. 9, 12 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
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damages.97
In Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord 8 the purchasers of acoustical tile filed suit
against both tile contractors and a supplier of tile, alleging a conspiracy to
restrain trade and commerce in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the Sher-
man Act. The contractors entered into a covenant not to sue with the
plaintiffs in exchange for $20,000, and judgment was later taken against
the supplier for $50,000 before trebling damages. The court addressed the
question of whether the $20,000 settlement should be deducted from the
actual damages figure of $50,000 before trebling, or from the $150,000
award after trebling.99 The court noted initially that the supplier was
jointly and severally liable for the entire sum of damages under the anti-
trust laws.'00 Secondly, it articulated the well-established principle that
the plaintiffs claim is limited to only one full satisfaction.' 0 ' Reasoning
that the treble damage provision in section 4 of the Clayton Act was, in
effect, a provision for punitive damages, 0 2 the court concluded that the
settlement figure should be deducted from the trebled amount.' 0 3 Since
the plaintiff-purchasers would have recovered treble the entire sum of
damages had there not been a settlement and a covenant not to sue the
other defendant-contractors, the court felt compelled to grant nothing less
than "the whole to which they were entitled." The court did not con-
sider, however, the possibility of the supplier's seeking contribution from
the settling defendants or the effect such settlement would have on the
plaintiff's right to pursue his claim against the nonsettling defendants in a
contribution setting. The theory ofjoint and several liability prevailed and
courts and parties for a time did not address those other questions.
B. The Right to Contribution for Intentional Torts
Not only did courts uniformly find antitrust defendants jointly and sev-
erally liable for damages caused by a conspiracy between themselves, but
they also agreed that there was no such thing as an unintentional violation
of the antitrust statutes. 0 There must be some consciousness of commit-
97. Id. (citing Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321 (1971)).
The district court explained contribution as follows:
[I]f an antitrust plaintiff sues four co-conspirators alleging $100,000 damages,
and during the suit three of the co-conspirators are released upon a total pay-
ment of $50,000, and the jury returns a verdict assessing damages at $ 100,000,
as a matter of computation the remaining co-conspirator is liable for the entire
amount of damages trebled--$300,000-and his defense of payment will re-
sult only in a deduction of $50,000 from the trebled amount, leaving him with
a liability of $250,000.
98. 246 F.2d 368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
99. 246 F.2d at 397. The first method results in a judgment of $90,000 ([50,000 -
20,000] x 3); the second produces a figure of $130,000 ([50,000 X 3] - 20,000).
100. Id.
101. Id. at 398.
102. Id., characterizing treble damages as "a unique statutory penalty."
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., Solomon v. Houston Corrugated Box Co., 526 F.2d 389, 392 n.4 (5th Cir.
1976); United States Dental Inst. v. American Ass'n of Orthodontists, 396 F. Supp. 565, 571
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ment to a common scheme, some concerted activity, before the defendants
can be found liable."°6 This requirement of intent posed a problem for
antitrust contribution advocates since it has long been recognized that
there is no right to contribution between intentional tortfeasors. 10 7 This
principle was incorporated into the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act, which provides that "It]here is no right of contribution in
favor of any tortfeasor who has intentionally [willfully or wantonly]
caused or contributed to the injury or wrongful death."'' 0 8 It is apparent,
therefore, that creation of a federal common law right to contribution
under the antitrust statutes will confront courts not only with the task of
creating common law to fill a statutory lacuna but also with the fashioning
of a rule more liberal than even the modem trend in state and other fed-
eral cases.' 0 9
Contribution for Intentional Violations of Federal Securities
Laws. Judicial implication of a right to contribution may not be as novel
as it first appears. While sections of both the Securities Act of 1933110 and
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934" expressly provide for contribution
in certain circumstances,' 12 the right is also implied in rule lOb-5 actions to
prevent defendants from escaping responsibility for losses caused in con-
cert with others simply because the plaintiff sues only the other defend-
ants."' This right, however, did not emerge without resistance. In 1968, a
(N.D. Ill. 1975). One writer has attempted to distinguish intentional and unintentional anti-
trust violations, relying upon Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298
F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (see text accompanying notes 128-34 infra). The author con-
cluded that only unintentional tortfeasors should be granted a right to contribution under
federal common law. Comment, supra note 92, at 705. The language of § 1 of the Sherman
Act suggests, however, that there cannot be an unintentional violation as § 1:
presents a single concept about common action, not three separate ones: "con-
tract. . . combination or conspiracy" becomes an alliterative compound noun
roughly translated to mean "concerted action." There is little need to grapple
with issues about the meanings of the particular words of the statutes nor to
mark nice distinctions among them.
L. SULLIVAN, ANTITRUST 312 (1977), citedin Harold Friedman, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 581 F.2d
1068, 1072 n.3 (3d Cir. 1978).
106. See, e.g., Harold Friedman, Inc. v. Kroger Co., 581 F.2d 1068, 1072 (3d Cir. 1978).
107. Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799); see text accompanying
notes 11-13 supra. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 50, at 308.
108. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 1(c).
109. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 85, title C, at 385 (1937) (antitrust violations
are examples of conduct so reprehensible that contribution would not be permitted).
110. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77yyy (1976).
111. Id. §§ 78a-ll.
112. The Securities Act of 1933, § 11(o, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1976), provides that all de-
fendants guilty of filing a false registration statement who are jointly and severally liable as
a consequence of their actions may recover contribution "as in the case of contract" from
any co-wrongdoer involved in the same common liability. Such a right does not exist, how-
ever, where the one seeking contribution is guilty of fraudulent misrepresentation while the
other is not. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976), grants a
right to contribution to a person liable under the section who, along with other co-wrongdo-
ers, willfully manipulates security prices. The Securities Exchange Act, § 18(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78r(b) (1976), grants a right to contribution to a person who, along with other co-wrongdo-
ers, files a misleading statement with the Securities Exchange Commission.
113. See generally Fischer, supra note 82; Comment, Contribution Under the Federal Se-
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court first recognized in deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co.114 that an implied
right to contribution existed under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act" 5 and rule lOb-5"i 6 promulgated thereunder. In deHaas plaintiff
stockholders had brought suit for alleged fraud in connection with a
merger of three financially unsound corporations. A third-party complaint
was then filed against the corporations' attorney who had been responsible
for preparing the alleged false proxy solicitations. In a precedential ruling,
the district court analogized the judicially implied causes of action to the
express provisions in the securities acts that allow contribution and refused
to dismiss the third-party complaint.' 17 The court stated that "[s]ince the
specific liability provisions of the Act provide for contribution, it appears
that contribution should be permitted when liability is implied under Sec-
tion 10(b).""' 8
That logic was rejected, however, in State Mutual Life Assurance Co. of
America v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co." 9 Although the court recog-
nized that another district court had allowed contribution in section 10(b)
violations, the decision by Judge Tenney refused to follow deHaas, on the
grounds that the Supreme Court, in Halcyon, had disapproved judicial at-
tempts to fashion new rules of contribution in the absence of congressional
action. 120 The retreat was short-lived. A year later the same district court,
curities Laws, 1975 WASH. U.L.Q. 1256. It is important to note that some courts, when
deciding whether a right to contribution or indemnity exists, have looked solely to federal
common law. See, e.g., Odette v. Shearson, Hammil & Co., 394 F. Supp. 946, 954 n.9
(S.D.N.Y. 1975); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 167 n.7, 168 n.13
(D. Del. 1974); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc. (Globus II), 318 F. Supp. 955
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), af'dper curiam on opinion below, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 941 (1971).
114. 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), modifled on other grounds, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th
Cir. 1970).
115. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
116. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978).
117. 286 F. Supp. at 815-16.
118. Id. (citing 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1739-40 n.178 (1961)). The court,
however, would not permit the third-party plaintiff to prevail on a claim for indemnification
since the president of the three merged corporations would be in pari delicto with the attor-
ney if he were found guilty of fraud on the main complaint. 286 F. Supp. at 815. The court
allowed the corporation's claim for indemnity, however, because that guilty relationship
would not exist in relation to the corporation, since "[a] corporation is a principal which can
be liable for fraud only through the conduct of its agents." Id. at 816.
119. 49 F.R.D. 202 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
120. Id. at 212-13 (citing Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342
U.S. 282, 285 (1952); see text accompanying notes 59-64 supra). The court also refused to
imply a right to indemnity since the defendants' tortious conduct was active and equally
culpable. 49 F.R.D. at 212. "With regard to indemnity as between joint tortfeasors, it has
been established that a defendant's right to seek indemnification 'depends upon whether the
complaint against the primary defendant charges actual fault; sometimes . . . described as
'active' negligence, as opposed to 'passive' negligence .... .' " Id. (citing Collins v. United
States, 221 F. Supp. 356, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1963)). See also Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc.
(Globus I), 287 F. Supp. 188, 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), a dinpart & rev'd in part, 418 F.2d 1276
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970) (on grounds of public policy court refused to
enforce indemnity agreement between issuer and underwriter after both were found liable
for circulating misleading advertisement concerning sale of securities). It does appear, how-
ever, that indemnity is available under the Securities Act where one wrongdoer is signifi-
cantly more responsible for the injury to the plaintiff than another wrongdoer. See Gould v.
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through Judge Frankel, concluded that a right to contribution could be
implied under the securities acts. In Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Service,
Inc. (Globus II) 121 a judgment was rendered against an underwriter, is-
suer, and the issuer's president for violations of section 17(a) of the Securi-
ties Act and section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, arising from a
misleading advertisement for the sale of securities.' 22 After paying the en-
tire judgment, the underwriter moved to recover by way of contribution
from other defendants. Noting that "the general drift of the law today is
toward the allowance of contribution among joint tortfeasors,'' 23 Judge
Frankel accepted the language from deHaas analogizing section 10(b) to
the express contribution provisions in the 1934 Act.'2 4 Consequently, the
right to contribution was extended not only to negligent wrongdoers, but to
intentional ones as well. The court reasoned that since the statutory right
to contribution included willful acts, there was no reason why the implied
right under section 10(b) should be any different.'25 Furthermore, there
need not be a judgment rendered before such a right arises; 126 a third-
party claim will be sufficient to create the right, although the right will
remain inchoate until such time as joint liability is determined.
Numerous courts followed suit in ruling that an implied right to contri-
bution exists under both section 17(a) of the 1933 Act and section 10(b) of
the 1934 Act. 127 It became apparent that courts were no longer willing to
American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 167 (D. Del. 1974), and cases cited therein.
See generally Ruder, Multiole Defendants In Securities Law Fraud Cases.- Aiding and Abet-
ting, Conspiracy, In Par, Deicto, Indemnification, and Contribution, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 597
(1972).
121. 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), a'dper curiam on opinion below, 442 F.2d 1346
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971).
122. See Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc. (Globus I), 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), afd in part & rev'd inpdrt, 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913
(1970).
123. 318 F. Supp. at 957.
124. See text accompanying notes 114-18 supra.
125. 318 F. Supp. at 958 (citing Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc. (Globus I), 418 F.2d
1276, 1286 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970)).
126. Liggett & Myers, Inc. v. Bloomfield, 380 F. Supp. 1044, 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). The
mere fact that certain defendants are not named in the original action "should not insulate
them from liability for contribution to joint tort-feasors who are sued by an aggrieved
party."
127. Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 540 F.2d 27, 38-39 (2d Cir.
1976); Madigan, Inc. v. Goodman, 498 F.2d 233, 237-38 (7th Cir. 1974); Rice v. McDonnell
& Co., 442 F. Supp. 952, 954 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Odette v. Shearson, Hammill & Co., 394 F.
Supp. 946, 955-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Muth v. Dechert, Price & Rhoads, 391 F. Supp. 935
(E.D. Pa. 1975) (prior settlement in related case not bar to contribution); B & B Inv. Club v.
Kleinert's, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 720 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat,
Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (right to contribution ex-
tends to intentional wrongdoers); Liggett & Myers, Inc. v. Bloomfield, 380 F. Supp. 1044
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 387 F. Supp. 163, 169 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (right to contribution in actions arising under § 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act);
Getter v. R.G. Dickinson & Co., 366 F. Supp. 559, 569 (S.D. Iowa 1973); Sherlee Land v.
Commonwealth United Corp., [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
93,749 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Tucker v. Arthur Andersen & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,544 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); State Mut. Life Assur. Co. of America v.
Arthur Andersen & Co., [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 94,543
(S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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follow the policy recommended in Halcyon to await congressional action
on the issue. Instead, they took it upon themselves to fashion the new rule
allowing contribution, which they found to be in line with the general
trend of the law and a better articulation of the purpose and intent of the
securities laws.
Contribution for Intentional Violations of Antitrust Law. To date, only one
court has granted a right to contribution under the antitrust statutes. 28 All
others have maintained the reverential posture requiring congressional
mandate for any such change. 129 Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American Presi-
dent Lines, Ltd.3 ' was the first case to address in any detail the issue of
contribution under antitrust law. In Sabre the plaintiff settled with certain
defendants, who were then dismissed from the lawsuit. The remaining
defendants filed a third-party complaint claiming contribution from those
who had settled. Assuming that federal law was applicable to the third-
party complaint, the court noted the absence of any federal common law
case arising out of an intentional tort that allowed contribution.' 3 ' Be-
cause Congress did not provide for such a right in the antitrust statutes,
while expressly including contribution in the securities statutes, the court
concluded that "no such right should be implied."' 32 Sabre, however, did
not acknowledge that courts were then in the process of implying a right to
contribution under section 17(a) of the Securities Act and section 10(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act.' 33 Since the courts have now recognized the
right to contribution under securities law, that part of the rationale in Sa-
bre that relies on securities law is no longer valid.' 34 In essence, the firm
128. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179
(8th Cir. 1979); see text accompanying notes 143-62 infra. See also In re Ampicillin Anti-
trust Litigation, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 917, at E-1 (D.D.C. May 21,
1979), which suggests that contribution is appropriate to "further rather than hamper the
deterrent purposes of the antitrust laws." Id. at E-2.
129. See, e.g., Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 298 F. Supp.
1339, 1345 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (citing Halycon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp.,
342 U.S. 282, 285 (1952)). "The immediate inclination of a court would probably be to seize
upon the rule against contribution as applied by the majority of the states in the absence of
modifying legislation." Corbett, Apportionment of Damages and Contribution Among Cocon-
spirators in Antitrust Treble Damages Actions, 31 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 129 (1962).
130. 298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
131. Id. at 1343. "The economic interests with which this Court is concerned primarily
are those of the United States, upon whose trade and commerce the effects of the conspiracy
are alleged to have fallen." Id. The court cited Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Co., 317 U.S. 173,
176 (1942), in which the Supreme Court held that federal law should be applied where issues
of substantive law, although not expressly covered by federal statute, are within the scope
and nature of the enacted provisions. Such issues must be left to judicial determination, and
state law or policy to the contrary must yield. See Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. Na-
tional Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1182 (8th Cir. 1979); El Camino Glass v. Sunglo
Glass Co., [1977-1] Trade Cas. 61,533, at 72,111 n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1976). See also Corbett,
supra note 129, at 123-28.
132. 298 F. Supp. at 1345. The court did recognize, however, the recent trend toward
contribution among the states. Id. at 1343 n. 1.
133. See notes 121-26 supra and accompanying text.
134. The court resurrects the policy argument espoused by James that there would be no
settlement if the settling tortfeasor knew he might be forced back into the lawsuit on a claim
for contribution. This would not necessarily be so. See generally notes 232-52 infra and
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stance upon which Sabre was premised has been seriously undermined.
In El Camino Glass v. Sunglo Glass Co.'35 an antitrust class action
charged distributors and manufacturers of auto glass with price fixing.
One defendant filed a third-party complaint claiming contribution from
the president of another glass company. Relying solely upon Sabre, the
district court listed similar reasons for not granting such a right: (a) con-
gressional intent to exclude contribution, (b) the plaintiffs need to control
the scope of his lawsuit, and (c) the deterrent effect upon settlements that
such a right might engender. 36 The court was also concerned that al-
lowing contribution in antitrust cases, already "enormously complex af-
fairs," would create too many procedural obstacles. 3  The court
concluded that "on balance the ends of justice will be better served by
holding that contribution is not available in an antitrust suit.' 138 A year
later yet another court was confronted with a claim for contribution in an
antitrust context. In Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc.'39 a distrib-
utor of shell eggs was sued by egg producers for price fixing and conspir-
acy to monopolize distribution in violation of sections 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act."4 Judgment was rendered against Olson Farms for nearly
two million dollars. Olson satisfied the judgment and then sued its cocon-
spirators, seeking indemnity or, in the alternative, contribution. The court
perfunctorily rejected the claim on the ground that the alleged violations
were governed "exclusively by the federal antitrust laws and that said laws
afford no such remedy."' 4 ' El Camino Glass and Olson Farms are the typ-
ical judicial responses to contribution claims, for every case since Sabre,
with the exception of Professional Beauty Supply, has, in fact, followed the
Supreme Court's rationale requiring congressional initiative as a reason
for denying contribution. Currently, there are three such cases pending in
the circuit courts, all appeals from rulings denying any right to contribu-
tion in antitrust suits. 142
The only court to hold that contribution is available to joint tortfeasors
accompanying text. It could still be possible to give the plaintiff the "absolute right to settle
with some [defendants] and covenant not to continue its suit against them, while reserving
its right to continue against the non-settling defendants." 298 F. Supp. at 1346.
135. [1977-1] Trade Cas. 61,533 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
136. Id. at 72,112.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. [1977-2] Trade Cas. $ 61,698 (D. Utah), appeal docketed, No. 77-2068 (10th Cir.
Dec. 20, 1977).
140. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
141. [1977-2] Trade Cas. at 72,861. The court, unsure as to which law applied, also
looked to Utah's contribution statute. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-39 to -43 (Smith 1977).
There too, however, no right existed, since the cause of action arose prior to the effective
date of the statute.
142. Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v. Spencer Foods, Inc., Nos. 3-77-0780, 3-77-0990 & 3-
77-1080 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 1, 1978), appeal docketed, No. 78-3346 (5th Cir. Oct. 26, 1978);
Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., No. 75-2820 (E.D. La. Oct. 5, 1977), appeal
docketed, No. 78-1788 (5th Cir. Apr. 14, 1978); Olson Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,




in an antitrust action is the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals in Professional
Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc. 143 The court split two-
to-one in adopting the rule that contribution may be enforced among joint
tortfeasors in an antitrust action. Professional, a wholesaler of beauty sup-
plies, brought an action against National, another wholesaler, alleging a
conspiracy to share a monopoly with La Maur, a manufacturer of beauty
supplies. As a result of the alleged conspiracy, Professional lost the right
to sell La Maur products, which constituted a violation of section 2 of the
Sherman Act.'44 The district court subsequently granted National permis-
sion to file a third-party complaint against La Maur. The complaint al-
leged that, in the event National was found liable, La Maur, as a joint
tortfeasor and coconspirator, should be required to contribute its pro rata
share of the damages. 145 The district court dismissed the third-party com-
plaint on the ground that it failed to state a claim upon which relief could
be granted,146 and National appealed.
Stating that "sound policy reasons dictate such a result,"' 47 the Eighth
Circuit refused to follow the traditional rationale requiring congressional
initiative before permitting contribution that had been followed in Sabre
and El Camino Glass. 148 Instead, it found that the reasons advanced by La
Maur for denying contribution were unpersuasive. La Maur had initially
argued that Congress had intended to exclude contribution when it failed
to provide for the right in the antitrust statutes. While the court noted that
the antitrust statutes were not intended to be comprehensive, its principal
rationale for dismissing the argument was that federal courts have previ-
ously implied a right to contribution in other areas of federal statutory
interpretation such as securities fraud, aviation collision, and sex discrimi-
nation cases. 149 Halcyon had, after all, been limited to its facts by Cooper
Stevedoring, 150 and courts were now adopting a more balanced and equi-
table approach to fault allocation.
La Maur's second argument was that allowing contribution would inter-
fere with the plaintiffs right to control his own lawsuit.' If defendants
could implead countless other "joint tortfeasors," the issues involved might
become too complicated for a jury to comprehend. The court recognized
the potential seriousness of the problem, yet expressed confidence that it
could be avoided by judicious use of the trial court's power to sever. 152
143. 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979).
144. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
145. 594 F.2d at 1181. National also asserted a claim for indemnity, alleging that
LaMaur was more culpable and, therefore, that National should only be held secondarily
liable. Id.
146. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).
147. 594 F.2d at 1182.
148. Id. at 1183; see text accompanying notes 130-38 supra.
149. See note 73 supra, and text accompanying notes 71-74, 110-27 supra.
150. See notes 59-70 supra and accompanying text.
151. 594 F.2d at 1184; see note 28 supra.
152. 594 F.2d at 1184. Presumably, severance would require the original defendant to
bring his suit for contribution once judgment had been rendered against him and after he
had personally paid more than his pro rata share of that judgment.
[Vol. 33
CONTRIBUTION IN PRIVATE ACTIONS
Thirdly, La Maur postulated that allowing contribution would deter settle-
ment, since settling defendants would be wary of subsequently being re-
turned to the controversy on a third-party claim. The court did not
respond directly to this argument because the issue was not present in the
case, 153 but it did state that courts should be able to fashion a rule that
would protect the rights of settling defendants.' 54 The fourth argument
against contribution was that, since antitrust suits are so enormously com-
plex, it would be unwise to permit the defendant to complicate matters
further by raising issues of joint and several liability and contribution.
The court offered severance as a partial solution to the problem if neces-
sary, but it also cited to federal securities law cases in which the right to
contribution is recognized and in which no serious judicial management
problems have arisen.'55 Finally, La Maur argued that a rule that might
hold the defendant liable for the entire amount of damages would serve as
a greater deterrent than if the joint defendants knew they could share their
liability by means of contribution. Rejecting this argument, the court
found a more serious problem with the possibility that under a no-contri-
bution rule a defendant could get off "scot free" and thereby completely
avoid liability.' 56 "This possibility of escaping all liability might cause
many to be more willing, rather than less willing, to engage in wrongful
activity." 5' This is especially so "where a large or powerful tortfeasor has
sufficient economic influence to prevent a plaintiff from including it as a
defendant." 5
8
The court characterized the central issue as "fairness between the par-
ties."' 59 If contribution is intended to distribute a burden equitably be-
tween those responsible-between joint tortfeasors-"fairness requires
that the right of contribution exist among joint tortfeasors at least under
certain circumstances."' 60 The possibility of one antitrust defendant's pay-
ing the entire judgment while the other defendants completely escaped lia-
153. This question was presented in In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, ANTITRUST &
TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 917, at E-1 (D.D.C. May 21, 1979). For a discussion of the
case, see notes 257-60 infra and accompanying text.
154. 594 F.2d at 1184.
155. Id. at 1184-85.
156. Id. at 1185.
157. Id.
158. Id.; see note 28 supra. The court was "convinced that the result of automatically
prohibiting contribution among antitrust defendants in all circumstances would be to allow
a significant number of antitrust violators to escape liability for their wrongdoing and
thereby undermine the policy of the antitrust laws." 594 F.2d at 1185.
159. 594 F.2d at 1185.
160. Id. The court hedged its decision by permitting the trial court to determine when
circumstances allow a defendant to raise a claim for contribution from his joint tortfeasors.
The factors considered by Justice White in his concurring opinion in Perma Life Mufflers,
Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134 (1968), should be considered by the trial court
in determining whether an in pari delicto defense should be allowed in an antitrust action.
These factors include: (1) the defendants' relative responsibility for originating, negotiating,
and implementing the illegal scheme; (2) evidence of who might have been expected to ben-
efit from the illegal conspiracy; (3) evidence that one or more defendants attempted to termi-
nate the scheme but were thwarted; and (4) facts showing who ultimately profited or
suffered. Id. at 146-47.
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bility mandated, in the court's view, that a right to contribution be
enforced in the Eighth Circuit, notwithstanding the fact that intentional
torts are involved. 6' Since there was a possibility under the evidence
presented that Professional could claim a right of contribution against Na-
tional, the court remanded the case for further proceedings.
16 2
C. Prognosisfor Contribution in Antitrust Cases
If trends in the law can serve as a valid prognosticator of the future
direction of federal common law on specific issues, it seems clear that Pro-
fessional Beauty could be the turning point in the courts' recognition of a
right to contribution among antitrust cotortfeasors.163 Only ten states con-
tinue to follow Merryweather v. Nixan in disallowing contribution among
joint tortfeasors. 64 Halcyon 165 no longer stands for the denial of contribu-
tion in a noncollision admiralty setting, having been eroded by Cooper
161. 594 F.2d at 1186. For support the court cited Globus II, which provides a right to
contribution for intentional tortfeasors under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act.
See notes 121-26 supra and accompanying text.
162. The court did not allow Professional to proceed with its claim for indemnity, how-
ever. Its concern was that "[t]o allow indemnification would dilute the deterrent impact of
the antitrust laws. Only a realistic possibility of liability for damages will encourage compli-
ance with the antitrust laws and will protect the public interest in preserving competition."
594 F.2d at 1186. The court denied indemnity, notwithstanding the fact that "one joint
tortfeasor bears greater responsibility for the wrongdoing." Id.
163. Recently, in In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, ANTITRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) No. 919, at E-1 (S.D. Tex. May 30, 1979), motions by four container
manufacturers for leave to file amended answers to assert cross-claims for contribution
against settling defendants were denied. The litigation was brought against certain manu-
facturers of corrugated sheet and containers charging them with price fixing in violation of
§ I of the Sherman Act. The separate actions were later consolidated for pretrial purposes.
The court subsequently gave preliminary approval to 23 proposed settlement agreements
totaling $308 million, the 23 defendants representing 80% of the market. 1d. at E-I.
While noting the Eighth Circuit's recent opinion in Professional Beauty Su py, the court
concluded that, even were contribution to be permitted in the Fifth Circuit, such a right
would be inappropriate in this case for two reasons. First, the court noted that defendants
would be unwilling to settle the lawsuit if there was a possibility that they could be returned
to litigate the same claims against other codefendants. This, the court said, would impede
settlements, complicate the issues, and result in an unmanageable trial of the antitrust claims
were the defendants free to assert cross-claims and impleader actions against their
cotortfeasors. Id. Secondly, the court concluded that, because all antitrust claims arise out
of intentionally tortious conduct, the deterrent policies of the Sherman and Clayton Acts
would best be served by retaining a rule that places the entire liability for injury on any one
of the wrongdoers. Id.
The court went on, however, to anticipate the appeal of this issue and speculate whether
the rule espoused in Professional Beauty Supply could become the trend in future litigation.
Were that to occur, the court determined that such a rule should not be applied retroactively
to this case "where the settling litigants have relied on unvarying past precedent in reaching
agreements" with the plaintiffs. Id. (citing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971)).
Although the court's inclusion of this tangential point demonstrates its interest in resolving
these issues with finality, the possibility remains that, by its comments, the court is impliedly
supporting the Halcyon approach of preferring congressional action to judicial fiat.
Such a move may indeed be underway. On June 21, 1979, Senator Bayh introduced a bill
that would allow contribution in price fixing cases brought under the treble damages provi-
sions of§ 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). S. 1468, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
164. See notes 49-51 supra and accompanying text.
165. Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
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Stevedoring166 and its progeny.' 67 A right to contribution has also been
applied in aviation collision cases 168 and sex discrimination suits. 169 Most
importantly, an implied right to contribution has been found for inten-
tional violations of the federal securities laws.'17 Congressional silence has
not proven to be an insurmountable barrier to the development of contri-
bution in any of these cases. The import of Professional Beauty is that the
Eighth Circuit also rejected the traditional rule of deference to Congress
and fashioned a right to contribution in the area of federal antitrust litiga-
tion despite the fact that Congress did not explicitly provide for the right.
The purposes of the private antitrust treble damage actions are twofold.
First, they serve to deter violators and to deprive them of the fruits of their
illegality, and secondly, they compensate victims of antitrust violations for
their injuries. 17' This is accomplished through the treble damages provi-
sions of the Clayton Act,' 72 which was designed to encourage private en-
forcement of the antitrust laws by offering generous compensation
amounts to those harmed by the proscribed conduct and, simultaneously,
to erect a deterrent to those contemplating similar conduct in the future. 173
In deciding whether to provide a right to contribution, it is therefore essen-
tial to choose a rule that would best accomplish these ends.
As a hypothetical example to consider the efficacy of contribution as a
deterrent, assume a case in which four cotortfeasors have violated antitrust
law. The question thus becomes whether a defendant would be deterred
more by knowing that he had a one-in-four chance of being forced to pay
the entire amount of damages (and a three-in-four chance that he would
escape liability completely), or whether a greater deterrent would exist if
all four defendants knew that each would, in all likelihood, be forced to
pay one-quarter of the judgment. The Eighth Circuit was convinced that
the latter situation served as the greater deterrent; 174 the certainty of incur-
ring some liability outweighed the possibility of incurring it all.'
75
This is the better view. If equity and fairness are to be attained, a rule
that distributes losses among all culpable defendants in equal shares better
serves that purpose. No longer would one defendant, who may have been
only tangentially involved in the illegal scheme, be forced to pay the entire
judgment. 7 6 Yet, the deterrent effect of contribution still does not, in it-
166. Cooper Stevedoring Co. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106 (1974).
167. See notes 59-70 supra and accompanying text.
168. See notes 71-74 supra and accompanying text.
169. See note 73 supra.
170. See notes 121-27 supra and accompanying text.
171. Pfizer, Inc. v. Government of India, 434 U.S. 308 (1978).
172. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
173. Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251, 262 (1972); Perma Life Muffler, Inc. v.
International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 139 (1968); Shelter Realty Corp. v. Allied Mainte-
nance Corp., 75 F.R.D. 34 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
174. See notes 156-58 supra and accompanying text.
175. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179,
1185 (8th Cir. 1979).
176. Apart from the issue of how to distribute losses, there is also the question of how
permitting contribution would affect the plaintiffs control of his lawsuit. The Eighth Circuit
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self, definitively answer the question of whether contribution should be
allowed. If granting such a right substantially increases litigation
problems inherent in its availability, then it may be more equitable to re-
tain the old rule of no contribution for the sake of ease of administration.
Two major problems, therefore, that require more exhaustive considera-
tion are the effects of settlement 177 and the methods of apportioning dam-
ages. If it can be concluded that a logical, workable method exists to
unsnarl these administrative entanglements, it becomes clear that contribu-
tion should be permitted in the antitrust context.
III. APPORTIONMENT OF DAMAGES AND THE EFFECTS OF SETTLEMENT
A. Division of Liability
Assuming a right to contribution in federal antitrust law, one must next
consider the means by which liability is to be apportioned among the joint
antitrust conspirators.178 A basic approach to apportioning liability can be
gleaned from common law practice in regard to contribution among joint
tortfeasors, including federal common law,' 7 9 since a private antitrust
cause of action sounds in tort.'8 ° Securities and maritime law also bear
heavily on the subject. This basic approach to apportionment is compli-
cated, however, by the effects of settlement or nonsettlement, insolvency,
was not worried by this question. See notes 151-52 supra and accompanying text. Since the
federal rules provide a means by which the court may make its own determination of incon-
venience, prejudice, or confusion of the issues, a trial court has the discretionary power to
sever a portion of a lawsuit and order a separate trial. FED. R. Civ. P. 20(b). The question
of severance, however, must be balanced against the interest of adjudicating all claims at
one time.
177. See In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA)
No. 917, at E-I (D.D.C. May 21, 1979), discussed at notes 257-60 infra and accompanying
text.
178. Apportionment of liability implies contribution and not indemnification. The pre-
vailing argument against indemnification in antitrust cases is that it would "dilute the deter-
rent impact of the antitrust laws" by the possibility of shifting liability to only one defendant
who acted in concert with one or more codefendants or third-party defendants. Professional
Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1979). "If
indemnification were allowed, those found liable for breach of a statutory obligation might
escape liability as effectively as if contribution were denied." Id. The exception to this rule
is articulated in Wilshire Oil Co. v. Rifle, 409 F.2d 1277 (10th Cir. 1969), in which the court
allowed a suit brought by a corporation against its officers for indemnification of damages
flowing from antitrust violations. The corporation based its claim upon breach of fiduciary
duty. Furthermore, indemnification is contrary to public policy when the violators, in pan
delicto, act against the public interest by committing wrongs "graver than ordinary negli-
gence," such as securities violations. Professional Beauty, 594 F.2d at 1186-87 n.9. Profes-
sional Beauty leaves open the possibility of allowing indemnification based on a pendent
state law claim by the defendant's claim alleging tortious interference with business relation-
ships. Id. at 1187.
179. While it is established that federal common law governs the issue of whether there is
a right to contribution in an antitrust case, see note 131 supra and accompanying text, the
question of which law to apply in apportioning damages in such an action remains unsettled.
But see Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179,
1182 n.4 (8th Cir. 1979), in which the court, by implication, adopts a federal common law
approach to this question. See also Corbett, supra note 129, at 128.
180. See note 91 supra and accompanying text.
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judgment, the absence of certain defendants, and the status of a defendant
as a potential or an actual party to the suit.
Apportionment at Common Law. In his treatise on torts, Prosser views the
apportionment question at common law as "primarily not one of the fact
of causation, but of the feasibility and practical convenience of splitting up
the total harm into separate parts which may be attributed to each of two
or more causes."'' On the theory that it is better to attempt some rough
division than to place the entire burden on one coconspirator, Prosser enu-
merates what he considers common types of situations where the issue of
apportionment may arise. They are (1) suits arising out of concerted ac-
tion,' 82 (2) actions that present questions of vicarious liability,' 83 (3) suits
arising from a failure to exercise a common duty,'84 (4) actions resulting in
a single indivisible result,' 85 (5) damage of same kind capable of appor-
tionment,'86 (6) actions arising from successive injuries to the same person
or property,' 87 (7) actions where there is potential damage reducing the
value of the loss, 18 and (8) acts, harmless in themselves, that together
cause damage.' 89 Analyzing these categories, Prosser discovered that in
some "a logical basis can be found for some rough practical apportion-
ment, which limits a defendant's liability to that part of the harm which he
has in fact caused ... ."9o Interestingly, the only categories in which the
common law has found a logical basis for apportionment because of divisi-
ble liability are categories (5), (6), (7), and (8). In all others, the liability
has been joint as to all defendants.' 9 '
Some of the cases cited as examples by Prosser in his analysis of the
eight categories attempt to determine which injury, or portion of injury,
was proximately caused by which tortfeasor, or, in the alternative, which
tortfeasor bore a comparatively greater share of fault in causing the injury.
181. W. PROSSER, supra note 12, § 52, at 313 (footnote omitted).
182. Concerted action entails a joint enterprise and a mutual agency, so that the act of
one is the act of all. Id. at 314-15.
183. Vicarious liability is premised on agency law. Id. at 315.
184. Common duty involves the failure of two or more defendants to perform the same
obligation where either one's failure would result in the same injury. Id.
185. A single indivisible result is an injury incapable of any sensible division, e.g., death
or the complete loss or destruction of a house by fire. Id. at 315-17.
186. Damage of same kind capable of apportionment encompasses separate injuries to a
single person or property resulting from the separate acts or omissions of two or more per-
sons. Id. at 317-20.
187. Successive injuries are "severable in point of time" where neither tortfeasor has any
responsibility for the loss caused by the other. Id. at 320-21.
188. Potential damage from one cause that reduces the value of the loss inflicted by an-
other is presented where, for example, A shoots B, killing him instantly, two minutes after C
has administered to B a slow poison certain to cause death. Id. at 321-22.
189. Acts harmless in themselves that together cause damage are torts premised on a
duty in each defendant to take account of the surrounding circumstances and reasonably
ascertainable conduct of other defendants. For example, all defendants may be liable for
the pollution of a stream where the impurities traceable to each defendant are harmless, but
taken together render the water unfit for use. Id. at 322-23.
190. Id. at 313. Prosser found that a logical basis for apportionment existed in categories
(5), (6), (7), and (8).
191. Id. § 50, at 310.
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Either analysis is a means to the same end: an assessment of the amount of
damages that each wrongdoer will be required to pay. The rules obtained
from these common law cases do not present a simple method for appor-
tionment of damages in antitrust cases. Cases of "concerted action" and
"single indivisible result" are the most comparable to the modern antitrust
private treble damage suit because of the conspiratorial nature of the ac-
tion. Accordingly, if the sheer weight of these sometimes analogous cases
is to govern treatment under the antitrust statutes, liability would be ap-
portioned on a pro rata basis.
Because of the long-standing common law rule barring contribution be-
tween intentional tortfeasors, few decisions have considered until recently
how contribution among intentional tortfeasors is to be apportioned. As
between negligent tortfeasors, the general common law view was that, al-
though the negligence of one tortfeasor might be greater than that of an-
other, the method of apportioning contribution still should be on a strict
pro rata basis. 92 A minority of common law cases held to the contrary.1
93
For a time, courts seeking to apportion contribution or award indemnifica-
tion in negligence cases measured the relative liability of each defendant
on the basis of an "active-passive" negligence test."9 Operating on the
premise that a "passively" negligent defendant was less culpable than an
"actively" negligent one, the test was difficult to apply and, in some in-
stances, unworkable. Hence, it was rejected not long after its formula-
tion.'95 Similarly, an earlier adopted formula apportioning damages in
negligence cases on the basis of "gross" negligence on the part of one
tortfeasor and "ordinary" negligence on the part of another quickly lost
favor with the courts. 19 6
Joint tortfeasors acting in concert were, at common law, liable for all
injury done, the act of one being deemed the act of all.' 9 7 It followed,
then, that there was seldom a logical basis upon which a jury could appor-
tion damages as between such cotortfeasors. 198 Therefore, apportionment
of damages usually was not done in the case of joint tortfeasors acting in
concert.
Early common law barred a claim against a defendant when the injury
complained of resulted from the plaintiff's own contributory negligence.
Gradually, however, this rigid common law rule of contributory negli-
gence was relaxed; instead, the courts developed a comparative approach
192. See Warner v. Capital Transit Co., 162 F. Supp. 253, 255 (D.D.C. 1958).
193. See Annot., 53 A.L.R.3d 184, 198 (1973).
194. See Nordstrom v. District of Columbia, 213 F. Supp. 315, 318 (D.D.C.), rep'd on
other grounds, 327 F.2d 863 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
195. See, e.g., Dole v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d
382 (1972).
196. See, e.g., Bieliski v. Schulze, 16 Wis. 2d i, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
197. "[AIl coming to do an unlawful act, and of one party, the act of one is the act of all
of the same party being present." Sir John Hayden's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. 1150, 1151 (K.B.
1613) (footnote omitted).
198. Note, Torts-Liability of Joint Tort-Feasors-Apportionment of Damages Between
Joint Tortfeasors by Verdict of Jury, 14 VA. L. REV. 677, 682 (1928); W. PROSSER, supra note
12, § 52, at 314-1 nn.24-27.
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that apportioned causal fault between defendants.' 99 Out of a policy of
avoiding the harshness of the early common law approach, state statutes
were enacted in a majority of jurisdictions permitting a comparative fault
analysis between the liability of plaintiff and defendant. 200 In part, there-
fore, the concept of comparative fault between defendants had its origins
in the common law concept of contributory negligence as well as in the
state statutes that superseded the common law.2° '
Pro Rata Apportionment. Again, the securities laws serve as a good anal-
ogy from which to discuss the question of apportionment.20 2 Contribution
in rule 10b-5 cases has been adjudged most often as a pro rata apportion-
ment, largely because it was favored at common law.20 3 The pro rata
formula has also been followed because it affords predictability of result
and administrative expedience.20 4 Moreover, the Securities and Exchange
Act of 1934 provides that a defendant may recover contribution "as in
cases of contract;' 20 5 the pro rata method was used in allocating contribu-
tion in common law contract cases.20 6
Pro rata contribution is not the sole apportionment rule in securities
cases, however. Some courts have fashioned a "benefits conferred" rule
that allows the exercise of judicial discretion to apply equity principles in
cases of extreme profiting by some violators. This is particularly so where,
as in Gould v. American-Hawaiian Steamship Co. ,207 the plaintiff obtained
from certain defendants, through settlement, a disgorgement of profits ac-
quired through violations of the proxy requirements of section 14(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.208 The district court reasoned that to
require contribution from settling defendants that never retained those dis-
gorged profits would violate a principle of equity merely to favor the lesser
jurisprudential consideration of uniform application of law.209 In so rul-
199. Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 463 (1970).
200. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 27-1764 (Supp. 1977); NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-1151
(1975); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (West Supp. 1979-1980).
201. Corbett, supra note 129, at 118-19.
202. See generally Fischer, supra note 82.
203. Id. at 1829.
204. Id
205. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976).
206. See Ruder, supra note 120, at 650.
207. 387 F. Supp. 163 (D. Del. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 535 F.2d
761 (3d Cir. 1976).
208. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1976).
209. The court's rationale was that
Even assuming for purposes of argument that pro rata contribution is gener-
ally applicable in securities cases, in these circumstances the Court cannot
conclude that the Litton defendants have been required to pay an inequitable
share of the liability to the plaintiff class. On the contrary, it could be inequi-
table to require any of the settling defendants to compensate the Litton de-
fendants for disgorgement of a benefit received by the Litton defendants.
Indeed, while several authorities have supported the pro rata measure of con-
tribution in securities cases generally, it has also been recognized that a differ-
ent result should obtain where damages are assessed under a theory calling for
disgorgement of profits.
387 F. Supp. at 170-71 (footnotes omitted).
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ing, the court relied in part on principles articulated in Gomes v.
Brodhurst,210 a negligence case in which the Third Circuit preferred the
fairness of comparative negligence as the measure of contribution.2 ' The
Gould court reasoned that disgorgement of profits is no more difficult ad-
ministratively than requiring pro rata contribution among defendants, and
thus permitted apportionment on that basis.212
In Professional Beauty Supply the Eighth Circuit adopted "a rule of pro
rata contribution except in unusual circumstances," without specifying ei-
ther what circumstances might call for the application of another rule or
what that rule might be.213 The court found the pro rata approach to be
required by both "the administrative difficulties of assessing exact percent-
ages of fault in complicated antitrust actions" and the reduced deterrent
value of a comparative fault rule. 2 4 The reduced deterrent value was seen
in the prospect that "under a comparative fault rule some parties may feel
they have little to lose in joining in an antitrust violation in a minor capac-
ity."'215 Simply put, the court envisioned too much of an erosion of the
deterrent value if the rule of comparative fault contribution were enacted.
One example of the "unusual circumstances" that might qualify as an
exception from pro rata apportionment was cited by the court in Profes-
sional Beauty Supply. 2 16 Wassel v. Eglowsky,2 7 a case arising out of a sale
of unregistered securities, had presented the question of whether two de-
fendants, Eglowsky and Stillerman, could claim contribution from a third
defendant, Goldman, on a fifty-fifty basis, or whether Goldman's pro rata
share would be limited to one-third. Finding that the fault of Stillerman,
although arising from intentional acts, was largely "derivative," 1 e., de-
pendent on Eglowsky's fault, the court "lumped together" the liabilities of
Stillerman and Eglowsky to create one entity and apportioned liability
equally between that "entity" and Goldman. 8
210. 394 F.2d 465, 469-70 (3d Cir. 1967).
211. 387 F. Supp. at 171. The Gould court noted further that two courts had held that
pro rata contribution was proper for those found jointly and severally liable for § 10(b)
violations, citing Herzfeld v. Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath, 378 F. Supp. 113,
136 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), af'dinpart, rev'din part, 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976), and Globus, Inc.
v. Law Research Serv., Inc. (Globus II), 318 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), a fiper
curiam on opinion below, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971). In
neither case were damages awarded on a disgorgement theory.
212. 387 F. Supp. at 171.
213. 594 F.2d at 1182 n.4. The opinion does not analyze the merits of the comparative
fault approach or variations of it, possibly because the appeal was taken from a dismissal of





217. 399 F. Supp. 1330, 1370-71 (D. Md. 1975), aIJdon opinion below, 542 F.2d 1235 (4th
Cir. 1976). See also Feit v. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp., 332 F. Supp. 544
(E.D.N.Y. 1971) (applying comparative fault principles without discussing the theory).
218. The court cited RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A, Comment h (Tent.
Draft No. 16, 1970) as the paradigm for this approach:
h. Method of apportionment. The purpose of contribution is to arrive at a
proper distribution of the liability among the persons liable. Since it is an
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Comparative Fault Apportionment. Since damages as a general rule cannot
be attributed in precise sums to particular violations by particular defend-
ants, methods of dividing liability more ponderous than pro rata have not
been welcome in the courts. Recently, however, taking its lead from
Globus II, Gould, and perhaps Wassel, a court applied principles of com-
parative fault to apportion contribution in a rule 10b-5 and common law
fraud action.219 McLean v. Alexander represents a detailed comparative
fault analysis of willful violations and their effects. A purchaser of stock
had settled his securities fraud claim against the sellers and had obtained
judgment against an accountant. The District Court for Delaware held
that the accountant was entitled to contribution from the sellers in an
amount proportionate to their fault. In apportioning the damages, the
court was forced to choose from (1) a "head count" or per capita approach,
whereby the accountant and the four sellers would share liability in the
amount of twenty percent each, (2) an "entity" theory, apportioning fifty
percent of the liability to the sellers as a group and the remaining fifty
percent to the accountant, or (3) some other equitable method. 22' Noting
the "vast difference between defendants in the degrees of their wrongdo-
ing,, 221 the court sought to reflect that fact in the apportionment. Since
the sellers "personally created the web of deceit which ensnared"2 22 both
the plaintiff and the accountant, and since the accountant, who committed
other violations as well, "recklessly prepared ' 223 an audit reflecting mis-
representations, the court adopted a variation on the "entity" approach by
assessing the liability of the accountant at ten percent while placing ninety
percent of the liability on the more culpable sellers.224 Allowance was
then made to the sellers for amounts paid in settlement.
equitable remedy, it is traditionally governed by the principles of equity as to
what is a proper distribution. Normally, "equality is equity," and all of the
tortfeasors who are liable may be expected to end by paying equal shares.
Thus if A, B and C are all liable to the plaintiff for the same tort, and A
discharges the liability of all by paying $12,000, he will normally have a right
of contribution against B to the extent of $4,000, and against C for the same
amount.
There will, however, be situations in which equitable principles will call for
a different distribution. Thus if B is the servant of C, or an independent con-
tractor, and C has become liable only vicariously for the tort of B, it may be
proper to hold B and C together for a one-half share of the total liability,
rather than one-third each. Again, if the plaintiff suffers harm through the fall
of a party wall between two lots, one of which is owned by A, and the other by
B, C and D in common, it may be proper to hold B, C and D together liable
for one-half, rather than one-quarter each.
219. McLean v. Alexander, 449 F. Supp. 1251 (D. Del. 1978), rev'don other grounds, 599
F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979).
220. Id. at 1272-73. This "entity" approach is supported by § 2(c) of the Uniform Act,
which states that if equity requires, the collective liability of some as a group shall constitute
a single share. The comment to § 2 states that the provision arises from the rule that class
liability is treated as a single share, especially where it is based on vicarious relationships.
UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 2, Commissioners' Comment.
221. 449 F. Supp. at 1272.
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As McLean notes, apportionment based on relative culpability is inher-
ently fairer when applied to cases involving both intentional and uninten-
tional torts.225 This was the view of the draftsmen of the 1955 version of
the Uniform Joint Tortfeasors Act,226 as well as of a commentator writing
at the time of its passage. 2 7 The McLean case amplifies the already strong
trend in tort law toward comparative fault analysis in apportioning
amounts of contribution.22 If comparative fault analysis becomes a rule
of law in other circuits as well, it will call for an exercise of judicial discre-
tion and prudence no less difficult than that required in, for example, the
sentencing of criminal defendants in securities or antitrust cases.
The McLean opinion adverted to recent commentary that insists that the
pro rata rule leads to arbitrary and irrational results while comparative
fault, on the other hand, "more directly stimulates deterrence, is only mini-
mally more difficult to administer and most importantly best serves jus-
tice. ' 2 9 The argument that a comparative fault approach is a greater
deterrent assumes that charging the more culpable violator with a rela-
tively greater portion of the total damage award is more prohibitive than
pro rata apportionment among many coviolators. Implicit in this argu-
ment is the notion that where the more culpable violator has higher expo-
sure to judgment liability, that prospect will give him greater pause
concerning the degree, nature, and scope of his violation compared to that
of other violators. The obvious counterargument for pro rata apportion-
ment is that it deters at the inception of the violation, in that the less culpa-
ble, more passive violator who faces the prospect of sharing liability in an
amount greatly disproportionate to his culpability will be discouraged
from participation altogether. The pro rata approach retains much of the
deterrent value inherent in the rule that entirely prohibits contribution be-
tween antitrust violators. Its deterrent value derives from the notion that
the "possibility of escaping all liability might cause many to be more will-
ing, rather than less willing, to engage in wrongful activity."230 On bal-
ance, the true deterrent effect of either apportionment rule remains an
open question.
McLean held that a comparative fault apportionment "is only mini-
225. Id. at 1275.
226. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASTORS ACT, Commissioners' Comment
at 87.
227. Gregory, supra note 2, at 380.
228. The court found guidance in comparative negligence cases "demonstrating that use
of comparative fault provides a workable and flexible tool for the apportionment of dam-
ages." 449 F. Supp. at 1274 n.7. The court also relied upon Professor Bromberg: "given the
possible complexities of securities violations, their intricate ramifications, and the suability
under lob-5 of relatively remote and insignificant parties, there will be occasions when it is
just and reasonable to apportion liability of lesser wrongdoers." 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURI-
TIES LAW: FRAUD § 8.5 (585), at 208.52 (1977).
229. 449 F. Supp. at 1276 (footnote omitted) (citing Note, The Role of Contribution in
Determining Underwriters Liability Under Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, 63 U. VA.
L. REV. 79, 96-100 (1977)).
230. Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179,
1185 (8th Cir. 1979).
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mally more difficult to administer," asserting that "[flor ease of adminis-
tration, one might consider these several factors for consideration when
apportioning damages: the defendant's extent of involvement, duration of
involvement, knowledge of entire scheme to defraud, intent, extent of his
contribution toward causation of the losses and benefit received."23
While many of these factors cannot be measured precisely, a careful re-
view of such elements is essential if a comparative fault approach is to be
administered with any degree of fairness and practicality. The importance
of the practicality of a method of apportionment is emphasized when the
several approaches to apportionment are tested by the effects of settlement,
insolvency, and absence of one or more violators.
B. The Effects of Settlement on Damage Apportionment
A primary question only recently addressed by the courts is whether a
settling antitrust defendant will be required to contribute to a judgment
entered against an insolvent or absent nonsettling defendant. If, on the
one hand, the primary result sought is the encouragement of settlements,
then a rule that imposes no further liability for contribution against the
settling defendant is desirable, even if it means the plaintiff may not re-
ceive full recovery. On the other hand, if the preferred position is to assess
a pro rata or comparative share of damages against all joint violators,
notwithstanding settlements, the settling defendant should be returned to
the action in order to determine both his contribution liability and whether
such liability exceeds his previous settlement. These conflicting positions
have led to inconsistent approaches by the courts.
Settlement in Securities and Admiralty Cases. On this issue, decisions in
maritime and securities law again provide the precedents. In Altman v.
Liberty Equities Corp.,232 a class action arising under section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act, the district court stated that "there can also be no
doubt that the non-settling defendants have a right to make cross claims
...and to seek contribution in cases brought under § 10(b) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act., 233 The court, however, refused to allow the settling
parties to provide for a proscription in their agreement, by indemnity or
otherwise, against subsequent claims for contribution by nonsettling de-
fendants.234 In effect, the Altman court's refusal to treat a settlement as a
231. 449 F. Supp. at 1276 n.84.
232. 54 F.R.D. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
233. Id. at 623. For a general discussion of settlement, apportionment, and contribution
in securities cases, see Fischer, supra note 82. Fischer notes "the implicit holding in Globus
I1 that contribution could be asserted through the use of rule 14 impleader against joint
tortfeasors who were not named in the original action," finding that such a procedure "obvi-
ates any requirement of a joint judgment being entered in the original action." Id. at 1831
(footnote omitted).
234. The disallowed class action settlement attempted to "bar and permanently enjoin
the non-settling defendants from prosecuting against the settling defendants any claim or
claim over for indemnification or contribution arising out of the subject matter of this or any
related action." 54 F.R.D. at 622.
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bar to contribution discouraged later efforts of settlement. Similarly, in
Muth v. Dechert, Price & Rhoads,235 a section 10(b) securities case, a dis-
trict court held that the provisions of a settlement between the plaintiffs
and certain defendants in a previous case would not bar a claim for contri-
bution by other defendants in a subsequent action. This holding was
based in part on the fact that the defendants claiming contribution had
neither been parties to nor received notice of the settlement.
Although a variety of factual patterns may confront the courts in a claim
for contribution by a joint tortfeasor, if one cotortfeasor proposes to settle,
or has settled, with the plaintiff, such patterns can be classified into two
basic categories.236 First are cases in which a settling defendant, receiving
a release from the plaintiff that also preserves the plaintiffs recovery rights
against a codefendant, is nevertheless liable for contribution in the absence
of a contrary agreement between defendants. 237 Contribution liability in
this situation is an amount equal to the settling defendant's proportional
fault less the amount he has paid in settlement. Moreover, plaintiffs re-
covery against the nonsettling defendant is reduced by the amount actually
paid by the settling defendant. 238  The Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act, cited in Gomes v. Brodhurst,23 9 follows this rule in the
event there is no "pro rata reduction" stipulation contained in the settle-
ment agreement.24
In the second group are cases holding that a settling defendant who re-
ceives a release from the plaintiff, preserving plaintiffs rights against a
235. 391 F. Supp. 935 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
236. Doyle v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 701, 710 n.5 (D.S.C. 1977).
237. [T~he usual form of general release . . . will not prevent a plaintiff from
suing a [nonsettling] joint tortfeasor. If such a subsequent action were brought
against the joint tortfeasor, then it is predictable that the party who thought he
purchased his peace . . . will now find himself right back in the litigation as a
third-party defendant. The consideration paid is non-refundable and may
only be used as a partial affirmative defense in mitigation of plaintiffs dam-
ages.
Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F. Supp. 230, 239
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (quoting Ausubel, The Impact of New York's Judicially Created LossAppor-
tionment Amongst Tortfeasors-Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 38 ALBANY L. REV. 155, 169-70
(1974)).
238. Currently pending before the Senate is a bill that would allow contribution in price
fixing cases. It provides in part:
A release or a covenant not to sue or not to enforce a judgment received in
settlement by one of two or more persons subject to contribution under this
section shall not discharge any other persons from liability unless its terms
expressly so provide. The court shall reduce the claim of the person giving the
release or covenant against other persons subject to liability by the greatest of:
(1) any amount stipulated by the release or covenant, (2) the amount of con-
sideration paid for it, or (3) treble the actual damages attributable to the set-
tling person's sales or purchases of goods or services. Under item (3) above,
actual damages shall not be trebled in proceedings under section 4A of this
Act.
S. 1468, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. (1979).
239. 394 F.2d 465 (3d Cir. 1967).
240. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 4; cf. Simonsen v. Barlo
Plastics Co., 551 F.2d 469 (1st Cir. 1977) (denying a nonsettling codefendant's right to con-
tribution, although reducing damages by the amount actually paid).
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nonsettling codefendant, is not liable for contribution. 241 In these cases,
the plaintiff's recovery against the nonsettling defendant is reduced by an
amount attributable to the settling defendant's proportional fault.
In Doyle v. United States242 the court chose the second approach and
reduced the plaintiffs recovery against the nonsettling defendant by an
amount attributable to the settling defendant's proportional fault. 24 3 The
court's rationale in preferring the "reduction by proportional fault ap-
proach" is aptly stated:
The better rule, this court feels, is to respect the aleatory nature of the
settlement process and to hold both the plaintiff and settling defend-
ant to their gamble. The plaintiff gambles that the amount he receives
in settlement plus the amount recoverable from the non-settling de-
fendant will be greater than he could have recovered if he pursued
both actions to judgment (i.e., the plaintiff hopes the settling defend-
ant will pay more than what is eventually determined to be his pro-
portional share of the damages). The settling defendant gambles that
the amount he pays in settlement is less than he ultimately would be
liable to pay, had he gone to judgment. To allow the plaintiff, to, in
effect, "void" this bargain and execute against the non-settling de-
fendant for the entire damage award less the amount actually paid in
settlement, with a right of cross claim preserved against the settling
defendant in favor of the non-settling defendant, runs contrary to
241. See, e.g., Luke v. Signal Oil & Gas Co., 523 F.2d 1190 (5th Cir. 1975) (applying
Louisiana law); Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974) (construing wording of
release under Pennsylvania law); Gomes v. Brodhurst, 394 F.2d 465, 468 (3d Cir. 1967)
(discussing several alternatives before deciding a point of Virgin Island's common law);
Fruge v. Damson Drilling Co., 423 F. Supp. 1276 (W.D. La. 1976) (maritime law); Leger v.
Drilling Well Control, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 358 (W.D. La. 1976) (maritime law). The court in
Doyle v. United States contrasted the two approaches:
Assume plaintiff is in an accident with defendant (N) and defendant (S).
Plaintiff, whose damages are $100,000.00, is not at fault, while the fault is
apportioned at 40% to defendant (N) and 60% to defendant (S). Plaintiff set-
tles with defendant (S) for $20,000.00. Under theory (a) above, the recovery
by the plaintiff against defendant (N) is reduced by the dollar amount-
($20,000.00)-paid by defendant (S) in settlement. Thus, plaintiff can execute
against defendant (N) for $80,000.00 and defendant (N)-(in the absence of
an agreement such as a dismissal of cross claims with prejudice)-can cross
claim for contribution against defendant (S) in the amount of $40,000.00 (i.e.,
$60,000.00 attributable to defendant (S)'s negligence less the amount paid by
defendant (S) in settlement).
On the other hand, under theory (b), the plaintiff can recover from the de-
fendant (N) only $40,000.00--(that is the total amount of plaintiff's damages
($100,000.00) reduced by an amount attributable to defendant (S)'s propor-
tional fault ($60,000.00)). Since defendant (N) has had to pay only what he
would be liable for due to his own negligence, he has no cross action against
defendant (S). [Note that this court is not faced with the correlative question
of whether a settling defendant, who, as events later reveal, has paid more
than his share of the plaintiff's recovery can enforce contribution against the
non-settling defendant. Such a situation would arise in the case above if de-
fendant (S) was found to be anything less than 20% at fault. See, Castillo Vda
Perdomo P. Roger Construction Co., 418 F. Supp. 529 (E.D. Penn. 1976)].
441 F. Supp. 701, 710 n.5 (D.S.C. 1977) (emphasis in original).
242. 441 F. Supp. 701 (D.S.C. 1977).
243. Id. at 711 n.5 (citing United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975);
Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406, 409 (1953)).
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logic and to the theory adopted by the Supreme Court in maritime
collision cases.24
As the Doyle court noted, or, in the face of the potentially complex permu-
tations and combinations, was perhaps recommending, codefendants can
alter their liability for contribution by contract or other legal action, such
as dismissal of a cross-claim with prejudice.245
Apportionment between joint tortfeasors, some of whom pay prejudg-
ment settlements greater than their later-adjudged pro rata liability, is de-
termined in some securities cases by the rule enunciated in Herzfeld v.
Laventhol, Krekstein, Horwath & Horwath.246 Herzfeld held that such a
settling defendant, by virtue of his payment in excess of his pro rata share,
could no longer be classified as a "joint tortfeasor. ' 2 47 Thus, "by the dint
of the settlement" the settling tortfeasor could not properly be made a de-
fendant in an action for contribution by the nonsettling tortfeasor. The
problem under Herzfeld, from the point of view of the settling tortfeasor, is
that it is unknown until after a final judgment in the main action whether
the settling tortfeasor's payment was greater than his pro rata share of lia-
bility.248 The settling tortfeasor therefore cannot, under the Herzfeld rule,
be assured that he is no longer a joint tortfeasor and thereby immune to an
action for contribution by the nonsettling defendant until the judgment
becomes final. Under section 4 of the Uniform Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act, a settling tortfeasor would not have this concern, as that
section provides that a release in good faith discharges a tortfeasor from all
liability for contribution regardless of whether the release was obtained for
a pro rata or greater share of the adjudged liability.249
The requirement that a settling tortfeasor assume a pro rata or greater
share of the liability in order to be immune to a later action for contribu-
tion arises out of a concern that either discrimination by a plaintiff in set-
tling with a cotortfeasor or some collusion between the plaintiff and the
settling tortfeasor will operate, under the pro rata rule, to shift unjust por-
tions of liability to a less culpable, nonsettling tortfeasor. Thus, under the
pro rata rule, if plaintiff settles with A, the most culpable defendant, for
$10,000 and the total amount of damages is later adjudged at $100,000, A's
nonsettling cotortfeasors, B, C, and D, will face a joint liability of $90,000.
The principle applied in Herzfeld cures the obvious unfairness inherent in
this example by permitting an action against A by B, C, and D for contri-
bution according to pro rata share, ie., for $30,000 less $25,000, or $5,000
each.
In this sense, section 4 of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act perhaps goes too far in encouraging settlements, since it completely
244. 441 F. Supp. at 711 n.5 (citing United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397
(1975)).
245. 441 F. Supp. at 711 (citing United States v. Immordino, 534 F.2d 1378 (10th Cir.
1976); Muth v. Dechert, Price & Rhoads, 391 F. Supp. 935, 939 (E.D. Pa. 1975)).
246. 540 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1976).
247. Id. at 39.
248. Fischer, supra note 82, at 1832.
249. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 2.
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absolves a "good faith" low-settling tortfeasor from contribution liability.
While the Act has the advantage of allowing for a pro tanto reduction in
the amount an injured party can collect from the nonsettling joint
tortfeasors, a plaintiff may abuse the pro rata rule by proceeding against
remaining nonsettling defendants who, under the Act, have no action for
contribution against the settling defendant.25 ° On the other hand, while
the Herzfeld rule imposes some hardship on a settling cotortfeasor seeking
to forecast the total liability, it seems inherently fairer to disadvantage him
rather than to burden the nonsettling, less culpable defendants with grossly
disproportionate shares of the liability.
The converse of the above problem arises when, prior to judgment, a
cotortfeasor settles with the plaintiff for an amount that exceeds his later-
adjudged pro rata share. In this situation such a defendant will seek con-
tribution from those defendants who incurred less than pro rata liability.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts generally prevents such a high-settling
defendant from seeking contribution for the amount exceeding a reason-
able settlement; the reasonableness of the settlement, however, is left open
to inquiry in a suit for contribution.25' Section l(d) of the Uniform Act
takes the Restatement approach and provides that
[a] tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with a claimant is not enti-
tled to recover contribution from another tortfeasor whose liability for
the injury or wrongful death is not extinguished by the settlement nor
in respect to any amount paid in a settlement which is in excess of
what was reasonable.252
Effects of Settlement in Antitrust Cases. Because courts have not until re-
cently recognized a right of contribution in antitrust cases, they have not
yet determined contribution rules that take account of settlement. Presum-
ably, the precedents in maritime and securities law will, with some varia-
250. Id. § 4. The Comment to § 4b states that "[i]t seems more important not to discour-
age settlements than to make an attempt of doubtful effectiveness to prevent discrimination
by plaintiffs, or collusion in the suit." While the nonsettling defendants arguably may still
assert a claim alleging lack of good faith against the settling parties, that alternative is ineffi-
cient in that it increases litigation before the final apportionment of damages between the
cotortfeasors. Carried to its extreme, this will approach a comparative fault apportionment.
In New York, a general doctrine of "fairness between the parties" requires that when one
tortfeasor settles with an injured party, that injured party should get no more than he bar-
gained for. Hence, a settling party subsequently found liable in a securities case for an
amount to be contributed may deduct from his apportioned share of the damages the settle-
ment sum already paid. Alexander & Baldwin, Inc. v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 385 F.
Supp. 230, 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
251. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A, Comment d (1965) states:
In particular, when a tortfeasor without suffering a judgment against him has
voluntarily made a settlement with the plaintiff and a payment that exceeds
any amount that would be reasonable under the circumstances, he should not
be permitted to inflict liability for contribution regarding the excess upon an-
other tortfeasor who has not entered into the same settlement. The reasona-
bleness of the settlement is always open to inquiry in the suit for contribution,
and the tortfeasor making it has the burden of establishing the reasonableness
of the payment he had made.
252. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § l(d).
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tions, be applied in the settlement context-as they have in recognition of
the right itself. Nonetheless, a short line of antitrust contribution cases
sheds some light on the settlement question.
In Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd.25 3 the district
court refused to allow a nonsettling defendant to assert a claim for contri-
bution and indemnity against its settling codefendant. The Sabre decision,
however, was based upon the nonexistence of contribution liability itself,
rather than upon considerations of the correct application of the rule of
contribution to settling and nonsettling codefendants. Most courts have
followed the Sabre holding and not reached the settlement issue.
In Olson Farms, Inc. Y. Safeway Stores, Inc. ,254 an action under sections
1 and 2 of the Sherman Act,255 the damages assessed against Olson Farms
amounted to $2,405,580.30 after trebling, interest, court costs, and attor-
neys' fees. Olson Farms satisfied the judgment and brought a third-party
complaint for contribution against its alleged coconspirators. This com-
plaint was summarily dismissed on the ground that its allegations were
without support in the federal antitrust laws. Professional Beauty Supply,
however, subsequently recognized for the first time a right to contribution,
although it still did not address the problem posed by settlements. 256
More recently, in In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation257 a nonsettling
codefendant, Bristol-Myers Company, sought contribution from a settling
defendant, Beecham Group Limited, by way of cross-action. Primarily be-
cause the court saw a potential prejudice to plaintiffs and to Beecham if the
contribution claims caused each to lose the benefits of their court-ap-
proved settlement, it disallowed Bristol-Myers' contribution claim. The
court stated that "it would be less than equitable" to order Beecham to
comply with the settlement "while remaining in the case by way of...
[the] cross claims." '258 Although the court noted that Professional Beauty
Supply had allowed a third-party complaint for contribution to stand, the
court distinguished that case as not dealing with "the problem of a joint
tortfeasor who has settled in good faith., 259 Moreover, the Ampicillin
court interpreted Professional Beauty Supply as "limited to certain circum-
stances in which contribution might further rather than hamper the deter-
rent purposes of the antitrust laws."2 6 ° The clear implication of Ampicillin
is that the "certain circumstances" under which the rule permitting contri-
bution will be invoked include (1) those in which an equitable settlement,
253. 298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
254. [1977-2] Trade Cas. 61,698 (D. Utah 1977), appeal docketed, No. 77-2068 (10th
Cir. Dec. 20, 1977). See also El Camino Glass v. Sunglow Glass Co., [1977-1] Trade Cas.
61,533 (N.D. Colo. 1970).
255. See notes 88 & 89 supra.
256. See notes 143-62 supra and accompanying text.
257. ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 917, at E-1 (D.D.C. May 21, 1979).
258. Id.
259. Id. at E-2.
260. Id In re Ampicillin also took account of the untimeliness of Bristol's motion for
leave to file cross-claims, noting that it was filed almost nine years after the litigation had
commenced and after a partial settlement between Beecham, Bristol-Meyers, and a certain
plaintiff class.
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already negotiated, would not thereby be precluded and (2) those in which
a violator would otherwise altogether escape liability.
This short line of antitrust cases addressing the impact of settlement on
contribution fails to take account of antitrust settlements that are non-
monetary.26' Such settlements may include credits extended by a settling
codefendant to another party, loans, and agreed business practices that in
themselves do not constitute violations. In such cases, from the standpoint
of one assessing contribution liability, the problem is how to measure
fairly the fiscal value of a specific nonmonetary settlement. Without such
a measure, a claim for contribution is not supportable, unless perhaps it
includes participation in some aspect of the nonmonetary arrangement.
Credits and loans may be readily susceptible to money valuation. On the
other hand, agreed business practices such as halting an acquisition, end-
ing an offensive distribution practice, or reinstating a product line are not
susceptible in most instances to monetary valuation and, to that extent, are
immune to monetary claims for contribution.
C. Insolvent or Absent Defendants
In antitrust cases the impact of insolvency or absence of one or more
codefendants is as yet unclear. Again, federal treatment of these situations
may follow state common law precedent, which unfortunately varies sig-
nificantly between jurisdictions. In some jurisdictions, a "pro rata reduc-
tion rule" operates to reduce the amount of damages recoverable by a
plaintiff who proceeds against nonsettling tortfeasors after he has settled
with other tortfeasors. Under this rule, the pro rata share of the settling
defendants' liability is determined by dividing the total damages by the
number of joint tortfeasors.262 The amount recoverable by the plaintiff
from the nonsettling defendants is then equal to total damages less the pro
rata liability of the settling tortfeasors. The obvious unfairness of this ap-
proach is that a judgment in an action involving an insolvent defendant
who has settled with plaintiff, would preclude plaintiff from recovering
against a solvent defendant more than his pro rata share of damages. The
plaintiff thus loses the "several" liability of each defendant. A rule that
would carve out an exception for insolvency or absence, allowing plaintiff
to have his full share of damages from the solvent defendant, less any
amount then paid, or paid in the future, by the insolvent defendant would
be inherently more fair.
Historically, where one or more co-obligors are insolvent, a court of eq-
uity, in the absence of an agreement to the contrary, divided the total lia-
261. See Halper, The Unsettling Problems of Settlement in Antitrust Damage Cases, 32
ANTITRUST L.J. 98 (1966). Halper notes that, "It is sometimes said that the three most im-
portant types of consideration involved in settlements are money, money, and money. (Per-
sonally, I think undue emphasis is placed on this third factor.)" Id. at 101.
262. Judson v. Peoples Bank & Trust Co., 17 N.J. 67, 110 A.2d 24 (1954). See Martello
v. Hawley, 300 F.2d 721 (D.C. Cir. 1962); Harvey v. Travelers Ins. Co., 163 So. 2d 915 (La.
Ct. App. 1964); Palestine Contractors, Inc. v. Perkins, 386 S.W.2d 764 (Tex. 1964). See also
Comment, Settlement in Joint Tort Cases, 18 STAN. L. REV. 486, 487-88 (1966).
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bility, including that of the insolvent co-obligor, equally among only the
solvent co-obligors.263 Courts of law, on the other hand, traditionally ap-
plied the harsher rule, from the plaintiffs viewpoint, that the insolvency of
a co-obligor does not affect the apportionment of damages between all ob-
ligors equally.264 Modern holdings have eliminated this distinction be-
tween law and equity so that the equity doctrine now prevails in the case of
insolvent defendants.265 Furthermore, the equity rule apportioning com-
mon liability among only the solvent co-obligors has been applied by anal-
ogy to a situation in which a defendant co-obligor was absent from the
jurisdiction.266 Accordingly, the total liability was apportioned between
the remaining defendants. Generally, however, the insolvency necessary
to invoke application of the equity rule must have been determined judi-
cially; without such a determination, the presumption is that all the co-
obligors are solvent.26 7 Equity decrees have also been drawn so that the
rule would operate prospectively, i.e., in the event that one of the judg-
ment-liable co-obligors later becomes solvent.268
In State Mutual Life Assurance Co. ofAmerica v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell
& Co. 269 the court dismissed third-party complaints against obviously
judgment-proof "strawmen," citing cases in which defendant employers
had sought to implead employee-drivers in collision cases. In striking the
complaints, the court reasoned that joinder of the third-party defendants
would serve no practical purpose T.2 " The basis for this holding is question-
able in light of later judicial developments, since it utilized in part the
active negligence and passive negligence distinctions in allocating liability
between codefendants in a 1Ob-5 action.27'
As one commentator has noted, antitrust defendants haunted by the
263. See, e.g., Easterly v. Barber, 66 N.Y. 433 (1876); Austin Road Co. v. Pope, 147 Tex.
430, 216 S.W.2d 563 (1949); Annot., 64 A.L.R. 213, 224-28 (1930).
264. See Annot., 64 A.L.R. 213, 228 (1930).
265. See, e.g., Hughes v. Boone, 81 N.C. 204 (1879); Faurot v. Gates, 86 Wis. 569, 57
N.W. 294 (1893). See also Annot., 64 A.L.R. 213, 234 (1930).
266. Moody v. Kirkpatrick, 234 F. Supp. 537 (M.D. Tenn. 1964), in which the court
noted that:
The determination of the amount of recovery is somewhat difficult of solu-
tion since two distinct rules have been developed for apportioning the com-
mon liability where there are insolvent co-obligors. Contribution is of
equitable origin but it has long been enforced in courts of law on the basis of
an implied contract entered into concurrently with the contract creating the
common obligation. . . . Adherence to the concept of an implied contract
caused the law courts to develop the rule that each co-obligor is liable only for
his aliquot portion of the common debt, no consideration being given to the
insolvency of other co-obligors since each impliedly promised to pay only
what was at the time his share of the common obligation. . . . The rule in
equity, however, based on the maxim that equality is equity, is that the com-
mon liability must be apportioned among the solvent co-obligors.
Id. at 542 (citations omitted).
267. See Tucker v. Nicholson, 12 Cal. 2d 427, 84 P.2d 1045 (1938).
268. See Jewett v. Maytham, 64 Misc. 488, 118 N.Y.S. 635 (Sup. Ct. 1909); Kimball v.
Williams, 51 A.D. 616, 65 N.Y.S. 69 (1900).
269. 49 F.R.D. 202, 213 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
270. Id.
271. See text accompanying notes 194-95 supra.
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spectre of contribution liability after settlement successfully coped with the
problem in the electrical-damage price-fixing cases brought by the govern-
ment and the Tennessee Valley Authority. Unique to the arrangement was
the cooperation of the nonsettling defendants who, in exchange for a gov-
ernment stipulation limiting its claims to their sales, agreed to forego any
claim for set-off against the settling defendants.272 Except in the rare cases
in which such a trade-off arrangement has apparently equal advantages for
the settling and nonsettling parties, the problem of contribution liability
after partial settlement will, in the absence of a Uniform Act statute, per-
sist.
The purpose of the courts in dealing with contribution following settle-
ment is not so much to remove uncertainties faced by the parties as it is to
remove the resulting unfairness of disproportionately assessed damages.
The importance of this simple fairness criterion, especially when it so often
conflicts with considerations of practicality or ease of administration, is
nowhere more forcefully articulated than in United States v. Reliable
Transfer Co.2 73 In this maritime collision case the Supreme Court over-
turned the automatic operation of the "divided damages rule," which had
required equal apportionment of liability in maritime collision or strand-
ing cases involving mutual fault.2 74 Noting that "[p]otential problems of
proof in some cases hardly require adherence to an archaic and unfair rule
in all cases," '275 the Court reversed one of the longest standing rules in
272. Halper, supra note 261, at 112, states:
Consequently, a settlement-delaying dilemma can arise in price-fixing cases
over plaintiffs interest in claiming against the remaining defendants on sales
made by the settling company. The plaintiff wants the tactical advantage of
being free to claim damages on all of its purchases; the remaining defendants
are faced with the threat of liability disproportionate to their own involve-
ment, and may be induced to settle more promptly or on more favorable
terms....
On the other hand, if the settling company's sales are not excluded, it may
be faced with a contribution claim by contract, or conceivably (though un-
likely) by operation of law, in the event of a later verdict against remaining
defendants. It is therefore naturally reluctant to settle and still be exposed to
further liability on the claims covered by settlement.
This dilemma may be more imagined than real. In the electrical damage
cases brought by the Government and TVA, plaintiffs refused to agree to
forego claims on settling companies' sales. The private treble damage liti-
gants, however, did generally agree to such exclusions. Without saying who is
right, I note the Government's solution, which provided for it to offer to stipu-
late with the remaining defendants that it would limit its claims to their sales if
they agreed to forego any claim of set-off. For such a procedure to be worka-
ble, however, it is obvious that all remaining defendants must enter into such a
stipulation.
273. 421 U.S. 397 (1975).
274. Id. at 407. The admiralty "divided damages rule," according to the Court, had its
origins in art. XIV of the Laws of Oleron, promulgated about A.D. 1150, which provided
that in cases of collision between a ship under way and another at anchor, the damages
would be divided equally between the owners of the two vessels, so long as the captain and
crew of the ship under way swore under oath that the collision was accidental. Id. at 401
n.3.
275. Id. at 407.
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jurisprudence:276
We hold that when two or more parties have contributed by their
fault to cause property damage in a maritime collision or stranding,
liability for such damage is to be allocated among the parties propor-
tionately to the comparative degree of their fault, and that liability for
such damages is to be allocated equally only when the parties are
equally at fault or when it is not possible fairly to measure the com-
parative degree of their fault.277
Thus, the Supreme Court left it to the lower courts to determine whether in
such cases it is possible to measure the comparative degrees of fault in-
volved. Following the lead of Globus II and McLean and its predecessors
allowing for comparative fault analysis in cases of intentional wrongdoing,
the rule of Reliable Transfer might be applied in antitrust cases. Such a
general rule would require comparative fault analysis unless the court
found that it was not possible to measure degrees of fault. Pro rata appor-
tionment of liability would be utilized when comparative fault analysis is
not possible.
From the point of view of counsel attempting to assess exposure of his
client in an antitrust action, especially early in the suit, such a rule would
make the task even more awesome. Not only must he decide whether it is
possible to measure fairly comparative degrees of culpability but also, if
so, how the measure must be taken. Under such a rule, counsel should
obtain the earliest possible ruling as to which measure applies. That rul-
ing, which in many cases might not be obtainable until the trial is near
completion, will have an impact on counsel's settlement recommendation,
if any.
IV. PROCEDURAL DEVICES FOR ASSERTING THE CONTRIBUTION CLAIM
Assuming that a right to contribution in antitrust cases does exist, the
contribution claimant must decide which procedural device to employ to
enforce the right. Critical to this decision is at what stage of the litigation
the decision is made by a defendant to seek contribution. If the decision is
made prior to judgment, two alternatives are available: the impleading of
a nonparty under rule 14,278 or the assertion of a cross-claim against an
existing coparty under rule 13(g). 279 A defendant may also wait until after
276. Id. at 401 n.3.
277. Id. at411.
278. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) states, in part, that a defending party may bring an action
against any
person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part
of the plaintiffs claim against him. . . . A third-party defendant may proceed
under this rule against any person not a party to the action who is or may be
liable to him for all or part of the claim . ...
279. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g) states:
A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim by one party against a co-
party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any
property that is the subject matter of the original action. Such cross-claim
may include a claim that the party against whom it is asserted is or may be
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judgment to assert a contribution claim; but if he chooses to do so, he is
limited to either utilizing a postjudgment motion under rule 59280 or filing
a separate action.28'
As a general rule, it seems apparent that the most prudent course to
follow is for a defendant to assert his contribution claims against all poten-
tial defendants at the earliest possible point. Such an early determination
is consistent with the general philosophy of the federal rules policy of ad-
judicating all rights of the parties in a single action.28 2 Indeed, the failure
to assert the claim at an early stage may give rise, under certain circum-
stances, to a defense of laches to a late attempt to enforce a contribution
right.28
3
In many instances, the appropriate procedure to be utilized is a cross-
claim. The propriety of this device is dictated by rule 13(h), which allows
the addition of a nonparty to a cross-claim where appropriate.28 4 For ex-
ample, if plaintiff sues A and B, and 4 desires to seek contribution from B
and from C, an additional nonjoined coconspirator, then A should cross-
claim against B and add C as an additional party defendant. Rule 14
impleader, however, would be appropriate when only one party has been
named as a defendant, and that party seeks to enforce its contribution right
against a nonparty.285
As in all other situations where an additional party is added, the pleader
must be conscious of jurisdictional and venue considerations. Since by
definition the contribution claim arises out of the same transaction or oc-
currence as the plaintiffs original federal question claim, it is difficult to
conceive of a situation where subject matter jurisdiction would present a
problem to the antitrust contribution claimant. 286 Additionally, section 22
of the Sherman Act provides that venue over a corporate antitrust defend-
ant is "any district wherein it may be found or transacts business., 287 The
same section also provides nationwide service of process over corporate
liable to the cross-claimant for all or part of a claim asserted in the action
against the cross-claimant.
Cf In re Ampicillin Litigation, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 917, at E-l
(D.D.C. May 21, 1979) (court denied motion to amend answers to assert cross-claims on
ground that motion was not timely).
280. See Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc. (Globus II), 318 F. Supp. 955
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), affdper curiam on opinion below, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 941 (1971).
281. See Southern Md. Oil Co. v. Texas Co., 203 F. Supp. 449 (D. Md. 1962).
282. See generally Vestal, Reactive Litigation, 47 IOWA L. REV. 11 (1961).
283. See notes 295-97 infra and accompanying text.
284. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(h) states, in part: "Persons other than those made parties to the
original action may be made parties to a counter-claim or cross-claim ...."
285. Cf Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179,
1182 (8th Cir. 1979) (antitrust defendant entitled to pro rata contribution from other joint
tortfeasors upon defendant's third-party complaint).
286. Principles of ancillary jurisdiction preserve a federal court's jurisdiction over a
cross-claim or third-party claim that would otherwise defeat diversity jurisdiction because of
nondiverse opposing parties. See 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 1436 (1971).
287. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976).
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defendants. 288
A difficult conceptual problem is presented with regard to the applica-
tion of any statutes of limitations. First, one must determine the applica-
ble statute. As a general rule, the statute governing the underlying tort has
not been applied to the liability for contribution.28 9 Instead, the statute
applicable to actions based upon an implied contract or a debt not evi-
denced by writing has governed.29°
The governing limitations period is most critical if the contribution
claimant chooses to bring a separate action after a determination of liabil-
ity rather than joining other potential defendants in the original action.
For example, if A and B are jointly liable, but plaintiff has sued only 4,
defendant A may still bring an action against B after 4 has been adjudi-
cated liable, even though plaintiffs claim against B has expired.29' When
the contribution claim is asserted prior to judgment in the primary action,
however, the statutes of limitations lose much of their traditional vitalityZ.
The limitations period does not begin to run until the action "accrues,'
which, for contribution, is the point at which liability for the underlying
tort is established. 293 Thus, when a party is named as a cross-claim or
third-party defendant in a contribution suit, the statute of limitations has
not begun to run,294 regardless of the posture in which the litigation actu-
ally rests.
The difficulties that might arise in a statute of limitations context are
typified by the previously discussed Ampicilin litigation,295 in which the
court denied leave to assert a cross-claim for contribution.296 Although
never using the term "laches," the court cited the lateness of the claim and
the prejudice to the other defendants that would result from allowing the
claim to stand. 297 The analysis employed in Ampicillin seems to be a more
appropriate course for the courts to take than to insist on strict compliance
with a particular statute of limitations. Again, one of the critical issues in
this area is the treatment of contribution after a partial settlement. A
288. Id. A nonresident individual defendant would presumably be served under the lo-
cal long-arm jurisdiction statute pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e), and the court could as-
sume personal jurisdiction only if the defendant had the requisite minimum contacts with
the forum. See Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); International Shoe Co. v. Washing-
ton, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
289. Adam v. Vacquier, 48 F. Supp. 275 (W.D. Pa. 1942).
290. See generally Annot., 57 A.L.R.3d 927 (1974).
291. See Globig v. Greene & Gust Co., 184 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Wis. 1960).
292. See generally 18 AM. JUR. 2D Contribution § 93 (1965).
293. Id.
294. Note that both a rule 14 third-party action and a rule 13(g) cross-claim may be
brought against a party "who is or may be liable" for "all or part" of the principal obligation
(emphasis added).
295. See notes 257-60 supra and accompanying text.
296. The contribution claimant had moved to amend its answer under rule 15(a) to assert
the cross-claim. The court's denial of such leave was clearly within its discretion. See gener-
ally 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 286, § 1487.
297. Lateness of claims and the resultant prejudice to defendants are the classic elements
needed to establish the defense of laches. See City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661 (9th
Cir; 1975).
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broad application of the doctrine of laches could be utilized to deter asser-
tion of late claims for contribution that might otherwise undermine prior
settlements or create other prejudice to the parties.
V. CONCLUSION
The right to contribution, founded in equity, has evolved slowly. In re-
cent years, however, courts have recognized and applied the right with in-
creasing frequency in both maritime and securities law cases. Insofar as
specific application of the right is concerned, these two areas of law are the
authoritative sources that will determine how the right is applied in private
federal antitrust actions. In particular, recent securities law decisions have
crossed the threshold between cases involving negligent conduct and those
involving intentional misconduct, when Globus II allowed a claim for con-
tribution for the first time in a case involving intentional violation of rule
lOb-5. Almost nine years later, the right was also allowed by a circuit
court in Professional Beauty Supply, an antitrust case under the Sherman
Act.
Once courts allow the right, they face the question of how to apportion
the contribution liability between coviolators. Two approaches are uti-
lized. The first is a pro rata allocation of the liability between the covio-
lators. The second method entails an analysis of comparative degrees of
culpability of the intentional coviolators. Assessment of liability for par-
ticular damages under this comparative fault approach to apportionment
assumes that it is possible in such cases to measure fairly the comparative
degrees of culpability of coviolators. In Reliable Transfer, the Supreme
Court, doing away with the "divided damages rule" in maritime negligent
collision and stranding cases, announced a rule that may be applicable in
apportioning contribution liability in private federal antitrust damage ac-
tions. The rule would mandate comparative fault analysis except in those
cases in which measurement of comparative fault is not possible.
Settlement considerations exacerbate the complexities of allowing the
right. Hence, two basic approaches, or variations of them, are taken by the
courts. Under one approach, a settling defendant who receives a release
from the plaintiff, preserving plaintiffs rights against a codefendant, is lia-
ble for contribution in the absence of a contrary agreement between de-
fendants. The contribution liability is an amount equal to settling
defendant's proportional fault less the amount he paid in settlement. The
plaintiffs recovery against a nonsettling defendant is then reduced by the
amount actually paid by the settling defendant. Under the second ap-
proach, a settling defendant who receives a release from the plaintiff, pre-
serving plaintiffs rights against a nonsettling codefendant, is not liable for
contribution. Here, the plaintiffs recovery against the nonsettling defend-
ant is reduced by whatever amount is attributable to the settling defend-
ant's proportional fault. Nonetheless, the settlement rules themselves
remain uncertain. Clearly, a definitive decision by the Supreme Court is
needed concerning the availability of contribution, the apportionment of
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contribution liability, and the effects of such a rule on settlements in fed-
eral antitrust litigation.
POSTSCRIPT
After the foregoing portion of this Article went to press, the American
Bar Association's Board of Governors authorized the Section of Antitrust
Law to communicate the Section's endorsement of draft legislation recog-
nizing a right to contribution. As reported in Antitrust & Trade Regulation
Report No. 936, at A-8-10 the specific proposal endorsed by the ABA pro-
vides that every antitrust defendant against whom a plaintiff alleges
wrongful acts or omissions will be subject to claims for contribution. The
contribution claim may be made in a separate action or by way of counter-
claim, cross-claim, or third party complaint.
Contribution claims would be barred unless filed within one year of
service of the complaint or sixty days after the claimant has reasonable
notice of its contribution claim, whichever is later. Defendants may mutu-
ally agree to toll the limitations period.
All rights of contribution by or against a settling defendant would be
barred under the proposal.
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